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A capitalist society with policies established to "regulate" the
promotion of competition in traditionally regulated industries such as the
electrical market seems counterintuitive. Yet, it is a reality in the United
States. In particular, traditionally rate-regulated industries, such as
electricity, have been "deregulated." In this context, deregulation means
opening up certain components of the industry to competition.
However, regulatory mechanisms in place to prevent abuses of the
competitive process are also driving this competition, resulting in a
"regulated deregulation." 1
Specifically, recent initiatives to "deregulate" the electricity
markets have highlighted that free markets thrive where competitive
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1. Harry First, Regulated Deregulation: The New York Experience in Electric
Utility Deregulation, 33 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 911 (2002) (questioning electricity
deregulation so far and encouraging "a more realistic design that can avoid the
deficiencies of the traditional regulatory approach"). Professor First focuses on the
deregulated New York electricity markets as an example of "regulated deregulation."
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structures in place do not suppress competition. Before Congress passed
PURPA (the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act) in 1978, electricity
in the United States was provided by a vertically integrated firm, which
provided transmission, distribution and generation service on a bundled
basis.2 Since this firm had a legally conferred monopoly, state public
utility commissions regulated its consumer rates. As a result, the
electricity market has consisted of a structural design supporting
regulatory entities that supervise and monitor the generation,
transmission, and distribution of electricity to end-users. Market
monitoring and intrusiveness on the part of state legislatures and
regulatory agencies permeate such structures and, therefore, cannot
sustain competition without additional policies intended to promote
competition. 4 In essence, such deregulatory measures "re-regulate" an
already regulated market.5
In a wholly regulated market, an electrical utility, servicing a
franchised service territory, would generate its own electricity and then
transport and distribute it to end-users, under regulated rate structures
for this bundled service.6 Federal and state governments regulated
pricing and distribution of electricity in order to protect consumers from
this market power and any external costs of electricity production such
as overproduction and the social costs of pollutants.7 Deregulatory
2. See generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great
Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1353-54 (1998)
(citing Richard J. Pierce Jr. & Ernest Gellhorn, REGULATED INDUSTRIES 1 (3 d ed.
1994)) (discussing how the nation's approach to regulating common carriers and public
utilities has undergone a wide-ranging transformation in the last quarter of the century).
See also Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Can Energy Markets Be Trusted? The Effect of the
Rise and Fall of Enron on Energy Markets, 4 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 1, 14 (2004),
available at http://www.hbtlj.org/content/v04/v04Weaverar.pdf (last visited Mar. 10,
2005).
3. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2.
4. But see ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS
15-20 (Fred Bosselman, et al eds., Foundation Press 2000) (Transportation of natural
gas, on the other hand, has been primarily interstate in nature). See also Weaver, supra
note 2, at 6-8 (describing the pipeline structure in the 1930s through the 1950s as
"monopsonist (the sole buyer in a field) and.., monopolist (the sole seller to a
distributing company or end user)").
5. First, supra note 1.
6. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2.
7. See ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 4, at 41-44
(describing externalities related to energy production). See also Weaver, supra note 2,
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policies have triggered an unbundling primarily through a separation of
transmission from power generation. Transmission remains regulated.
The jurisdiction over electricity rates of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) extends, in principle, to wholesale transactions,
though the extent of this jurisdiction over retail rate regulation remains
unclear.8  Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia have
legislation in place to "partially" deregulate their retail electricity
markets by implementing retail access, even though some states have
not moved forward in this.9  States' attempts to "deregulate" the
at 8 ("Because the early pipeline, like railroads, had monopoly power, regulatory
agencies were created to limit the rates they could charge so that consumers were
protected from this market power.").
8. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-824(n) (2005). FERC Order 888, issued in 1996, restructured
the interstate electric industry. By requiring companies to allow third parties access to
transmission lines through the "wheeling" of electricity, the Order essentially "forbids
companies that control transmission facilities from leveraging that monopoly power
into the upstream market for generating electricity or the downstream market for
delivering electricity to end-users." In this way, companies transporting electricity
through interstate commerce must also serve as "carriers" for other generation power
companies. The purpose is "to ensure that customers have the benefits of competitively
priced generation." FERC Order 888, 18 C.F.R. pt. 385 (1996). The Order has affected
primarily the electric power wholesale market and the states determine any other
unbundling, for example the retail market for end-users that would not reach FERC's
jurisdiction. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 1352-55; see also ENERGY,
ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 4, at 18-20, 41-44. But see New York
v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002) (in deciding whether FERC exceeded its jurisdiction by
including retail transmission within the scope of its open access requirements in Order
888, the Court concluded that it was a statutorily permissible policy choice: "FERC
chose not to assert such jurisdiction, but it did not hold itself powerless to claim
jurisdiction").
9. Legislation for retail access is in place in the following states: Arizona,
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Texas, and Virginia. The following states are not actively pursuing
restructuring: Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North
Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. West Virginia has a
restructuring plan in place that has not yet been approved by the Legislature or
Governor. The following states have delayed their restructuring process or the
implementation of retail access: Arkansas, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, and
Oklahoma. In California, direct retail access has been suspended. See ENERGY
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, STATUS OF STATE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY
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electrical markets do not transform old paradigms of regulation, in
which state governments created artificial barriers for new entrants, into
new competitive regimes. Rather, traditional regulatory structures
remain in place.
The pervasiveness of regulation in the business of electrical power
generation has left utilities little room for antitrust law.'" One
particularly useful tool for potential antitrust defendants is the state
action immunity doctrine. The original purpose of state action immunity
is to preserve principles of federalism and allow states to displace
competition in sectors of their domestic economies so as to compensate
for the failures of competition and protect the public welfare of its
citizens." Essentially, it is a judicially created exemption that limits the
potential antitrust liability of private parties, as well as municipalities
and government entities.'2 For an entity to successfully allege state
action immunity, it must prove that it is advancing the interests of the
state rather than its own interests. This is done by showing that the
conduct is pursuant to a "clearly-articulated" state policy and that it has
RESTRUCTURING ACTIVITY (2003), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/
electricity/chgstr/restructure.pdf. Refer to www.eia.doe.gov for more recent updates
of restructuring status nation-wide. See also ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS 17-26 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., Foundation Press
2004) (briefly discussing the history of the California's electrical power generation and
delivery system and the energy crisis beginning with deregulation in 1998.); see also
Weaver, supra note 2, at 6-8 (2004).
10. But see Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (holding
that an electric utility used its dominance in the transmission of power to foreclose
potential entrants into the retail area and therefore was not immune from antitrust
liability).
11. KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW
EVOLUTION 371 (Cambridge 2003) (explaining that "immunity helps secure the benefits
of federalism. With immunity, the states have greater freedom to experiment."); see
also Darren Bush and Carrie Mayne, In (Reluctant) Defense of Enron: Why Bad
Regulation is to Blame For California's Power Woes (Or Why Antitrust Law Fails to
Protect Against Market Power When the Market Rules Encourage its Use), 83 OR. L.
REV. 207, 209 (2004).
12. See Jim Rossi, The Electric Deregulation Fiasco: Looking to Regulatory
Federalism to Promote a Balance Between Markets and the Provision of Public Goods,
100 MICH. L. REv. 1768, 1787 (2002) (stating that "[u]nlike federal preemption and
dormant commerce clause doctrines, which limit public actors, state action immunity
relates to limits on the exercise of private decisionmakers in violation of antitrust
laws.").
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been "actively supervised" by the state. 13 Under a regime that promotes
competition rather than displaces it, broad application of state action
immunity would hinder state efforts to open electrical markets for
competing new entrants.
Attempts by states to implement "pro-competition" policies without
restructuring traditional regulatory paradigms have been problematic for
courts. Furthermore, the tendency of courts to defer to agency rulings
has shifted jurisdictional parameters and empowered the state regulatory
commissions. This has been particularly apparent in cases dealing with
the wholesale natural gas market and the filed rate doctrine.14  In the
context of state action immunity and partial deregulation of electricity,
broad deference to regulatory policy in addition to broad application of
state action would favor already established companies in the electricity
market, essentially empowering the regulatory agencies and in turn,
advancing the interests of the dominant companies which they
regulate.15 In this scenario, antitrust law helps to de-concentrate these
13. The Midcal test provides that anticompetitive conduct is immune from antitrust
liability if the challenged restraint is 1) "one clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed as state policy;" and 2) "the policy [is] 'actively supervised' by the State
itself." See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980) (quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power and Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410
(1978)); see also FTC, OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION
TASK FORCE (Sept. 2003).
14. See, e.g., In re: Western States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litigation, 368
F. Supp. 2d 1110 (D. Nev. 2005) (dismissing under the filed rate doctrine the plaintiff's
claim that "due to the deregulation of the natural gas market, Defendants never filed the
prices at issue with FERC, and therefore the filed rate doctrine does not bar [its]
claims."). This case illustrates the resistance of courts to exerting jurisdiction over
FERC with respect to the filed rate doctrine, even when deregulation of the natural gas
market may require such jurisdiction in some situations. See also County of Stanislaus
v. Pac. Gas and Elec. Co., 114 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 1997), Ark. La. Gas Co., 453 U.S. 571
(1981), and Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Grays Harbor County Wash. v. IDASOR, 379 F.3d
641 (9th Cir. 2004).
15. See John Shepard Wiley, A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV.
L. REv. 713, 723-29 (1986) (describing conceptions of regulation as a way to subsidize
private interests at the expense of public good and serve industry ends, causing
producer capture); First, supra note 1, at 924 (explaining that deregulation in the U.S.
has most often been led by the regulatory agencies and that public choice theorists
would not have predicted that "captured" regulatory agencies would push into the
marketplace the very companies they supposedly had been protecting). See also
ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 4, at 17 (describing
externalities related to energy production) (stating that it has been a recurring problem
353
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industry structures and prevent price fixing where regulation cannot. In
effect, broad application of state action immunity would continue to
preserve old regulatory structures where regulated entities such as
utilities would continue to dominate the electrical market, eliminating
any possibilities of consumers benefiting from deregulatory measures
promoting competition - lower prices and choices.
16
In a deregulatory environment, clarification of this doctrine is
necessary to guide the courts in their application of antitrust legislation
to private conduct without limiting the states' ability to regulate certain
markets while introducing competition into others. 17 If a deregulatory
policy is to be implemented, the courts need guidance in answering the
following questions: 1) does the clear-articulation requirement of the
Midcal test incorporate a state agency's declaratory rulings in
determining the scope of statutory law? 2) what is the connection
between the articulated policy to displace competition in a particular
market and the anticompetitive conduct being challenged? 3) will
legislatures need to be more specific in clearly articulating policy as to
the market and level of competition it is regulating (generation,
transmission, distribution)? and 4) how specific does the articulated
policy need to be in order to meet the "clarity" requirement of the first
in the energy regulatory sector that "the regulatory process ... be susceptible to capture
by the very interests it is designed to regulate and thus fall short of its public interest
objectives"). See generally Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Regulation and
Monopoly, 83 J. POL. ECON. 207 (1975).
16. HYLTON, supra note 11, at 374 (stating that "[i]f state regulation provides broad
protection from liability under the Sherman Act, then industries in which collusion is
sustainable will have an interest in setting up some regulatory program that is capable
of providing protection."). See also Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making
Sense of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and
Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REv. 1203, 1234-36
(describing the tendency of state legislators to vote, "[u]nder a norm of deference," in
favor of interest groups which they represent and who are benefiting from a single
regulated industry, at the expense of economic efficiency and without regard for
consumers' preference for the advantages of no regulation).
17. See generally Rossi, supra note 12, at 1787-89 (explaining that the possibility
of interest group capture of regulatory processes "gives rise for narrow construction of
state authority, along with an expectation of clear articulation of policies prohibiting
competition by state regulators, in such contexts."). See also id. at 1788 (stating that "in
a deregulatory era, courts should be wary of blanket deference to state regulatory
programs and instead should look carefully to the scope and extent of specific
regulatory provisions.").
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prong of the Midcal test and for a foreseeability standard to be
effectively applied?
This article seeks to provide possible answers to these questions by
exploring inconsistencies in the federal courts' decisions regarding the
scope and applicability of state action immunity. It concludes that
current application of the Midcal test will make it more difficult for new
entrants in the electrical markets to compete with already established
utilities.' 8 For example, in Trigen-Oklahoma City Energy Corp. v.
Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co.,' 9 the Tenth Circuit granted state action
immunity to Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., a state-regulated utility. The
Court deferred to Oklahoma's constitution, which set up a regulatory
scheme intended to displace competition with respect to electric utilities
in all areas related to the sale of electricity.20  The Trigen case is the
broadest application of state action immunity taken by a circuit court to
this day.2" However, inconsistency on the scope of the state action
immunity doctrine has been evident among the circuit courts for some
time. 2 Professor Jim Rossi, expressing similar concerns regarding
18. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
19. 244 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 993 (2001).
20. Trigen, at 1225 ("Because Oklahoma has clearly articulated a policy to displace
competition with the regulation of electric utilities and because Oklahoma actively
supervises any allegedly anticompetitive conduct, the state action doctrine immunizes
OG&E's regulated electricity sales from the federal antitrust scrutiny."). The court also
stated that "because OG&E is acting in accordance with a clearly-articulated state
regulatory program and because it is actively supervised by the OCC, we hold that
OG&E's conduct falls within the heart of the state action immunity doctrine and the
federal antitrust claims must be dismissed." Id. at 1228. See also Brief for Petitioner at
2, Trigen-Okla. City Energy Corp. v. Okla. Gas and Elec. Co., (No. 01-178) 2001 WL
34115993, at *2. The requirements for state action immunity are established in
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980),
through a two-prong test presented infra Part I.
21. See Kate O'Loughlin, The Trigen Case: Does This Mean Lights Out for Energy
Deregulation?, 14 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 345 (2002) for a list of 24 states passing
deregulation laws. See also Bush & Mayne, supra note 11, at 214-23 (2004) (for a
short history of the deregulatory policies passed at the federal level to allow for
competition in the electrical markets).
22. See, e.g., Nugget Hydroelectric, L.P. v. Pac. Gas and Elec. Co., 981 F.2d 429
(9th Cir. 1992) (holding that because defendant failed to show that its actions
concerning plaintiff's interconnection plan were the foreseeable result of state policy,
they were not immune under the state action doctrine); Columbia Steel Casting Co., Inc.
v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 111 F.3d 1427 (9th Cir. 1997) (determining that agreement
355
356 FORDHAMJOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. XI
FINANCIAL LA W
recent broad application of state action immunity, stated that:
[w]ith federal deregulation and uneven and partial state deregulation,
the extent to which state action immunity will immunize
anticompetitive conduct from the reach of federal antitrust law in a
deregulated electric power market remains unclear, particularly
given the traditional extent to which the states have regulated electric
utilities.
2 3
Some direction in resolving the ambiguities arising from recent
application of state action immunity in the context of deregulation of the
electrical markets may be found in the foreseeability standard
established by the Supreme Court in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire.24 The controversy regarding whether a foreseeability standard
among competitors to allocate territories was a per se violation of the Sherman Act
unless there was a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy displacing
competition with regulation; because that policy did not exist, state immunity did not
apply in this instance); Cal. CNG, Inc. v. S. Cal. Gas Co., 97 D.A.R. 1103 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding that where the state clearly articulated a state policy to shield utility
participation in the market from competition and there was active supervision of such
participation, state-action immunity was appropriate); Snake River Valley Elec. Ass'n
v. PacifiCorp., 238 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2001), remanded and amended, Snake River
Valley Elec. Ass'n v. Pacificorp, 357 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct.
416 (2004) (finding that state statute did not provide for active supervision of private
agreements to divide customers, and appellee's refusal to allow appellant to serve its
customers was not shielded by the state action immunity doctrine); Lease Lights, Inc. v.
Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla., 849 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1988) (determining that conduct
regarding electricity rates undertaken in response to state regulation was immune from
antitrust penalties); Trigen Okla. City Energy Corp. v. Okla. Gas and Elec. Co., 244
F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2001); Mun. Utils. Bd. of Albertville v. Ala. Power Co., 934 F.2d
1493 (11th Cir. 1991) (applying the Midcal two-part test to determine that general
provisions of the statute governing the conduct in question were entitled to state-action
immunity); Praxair Inc. v. Fla. Power and Light Co., 64 F.3d 609 (1lth Cir. 1995)
(applying the Midcal two-prong test to determine that the defendants' exclusive service
territorial agreement qualified for state action immunity); TEC Cogeneration Inc., Fla.
Power and Light Co., 76 F.3d 1560 (11th Cir. 1996), modified by 86 F.3d 1028 (11th
Cir. 1996) (finding defendants' conduct was immune from antitrust liability).
23. Rossi, supra note 12, at 1787 (2002); see also FTC, REPORT OF THE STATE
ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 13, at CH. II (expressing concern about broad
application of state action immunity, in particular with respect to the "clear articulation"
standard of the Midcal test).
24. 471 U.S. 34, 42 (1985) (explaining that in the case of municipalities, the clear
articulation requirement of Midcal is satisfied if the conduct in question "is the
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should be used at all in dealing with state action immunity arises from
the idea that just about any conduct could be construed as
"foreseeable. 25  In other words, "foreseeability" is in the eye of the
beholder. In response, this Article proposes that the "Hallian"
foreseeability standard can be a useful tool for determining whether the
anticompetitive conduct in question comes within a clearly articulated
state policy to displace competition with respect to the specific conduct
rather than a natural consequence of regulatory policy. 26 To have any
real impact, though, the foreseeability standard must be narrowly
construed to a specifically articulated state policy and to the
anticompetitive conduct in question, and not just to a general delegation
of authority by state legislatures to regulatory agencies. Otherwise, the
foreseeability standard would lend itself to broad applications of the
state action immunity doctrine, as in Trigen, and in the future render any
deregulatory policies ineffective as to new entrants.
Part I explores the development of state action immunity as a
doctrine that attempts to reconcile issues of federalism and state
sovereignty, first established by Parker v. Brown,27 and later expanded
by the Midcal test and the implementation of the "Hallian" foreseeability
standard. I will demonstrate that, in this context, Trigen is a natural
result of the courts' ambiguities regarding application of state action
immunity. Part II discusses cases that go beyond the original purpose of
Parker and the effects of empowering state regulatory agencies. Part III
explores the "Hallian" foreseeability standard as a window into the
struggle of courts in discerning state policy from regulatory policy. It
demonstrates the need for clarity when applying the clear articulation
foreseeable result of empowering the City to refuse to serve unannexed areas."). See
infra Part I.d.ii.
25. C. Douglas Floyd, Plain Ambiguities in the Clear Articulation Requirement for
State Action Antitrust Immunity: The Case of State Agencies, 41 B.C. L. REV. 1059,
1076 (2000) (stating that "[als the Hallie 'foreseeability' test has been applied by the
courts of appeals, it has proven to have essentially no bite, leading to the conclusion that
the broader the delegation of authority to act with respect to a particular subject matter,
the more likely that anticompetitive conduct will be held to be the foreseeable result of
that delegation.").
26. Id. at 1104 (stating that the foreseeability test "may be very much on point in
determining whether a state administrative agency or the head of an executive
department has acted within the scope of its delegated authority in articulating an
anticompetitive policy for the state.").
27. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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requirement of the Midcal test. Part IV looks at useful ways of applying
the "Hallian" foreseeability standard to the Midcal test that could help
courts identify inconsistencies with the original intent of Parker when
determining state action and diminish blind deference to regulatory
policy. I conclude by suggesting: (1) that the courts have, in fact, been
incorporating into the state action immunity analysis a "Hallian"
foreseeability standard as the "hidden prong" of the Mideal test; (2) that
a narrow construction of this standard could help illuminate ambiguities
created by the clear-articulation requirement of Midcal; and (3) that it is
imperative for the Supreme Court to clarify this issue prior to expansive
state deregulation.
I. THE BUMPY ROAD TOWARDS TRIGEN: FEDERALISM AND STATE ACTION
IMMUNITY
In order to understand the broad result in Trigen, it is useful to
explore the history and original purpose of the doctrine itself. The
landmark case, Parker v. Brown,28 first established that state action
existed in the context of antitrust law. Parker held that federal antitrust
law was not to intrude upon a state's sovereign right to regulate markets
within its borders. 29  There is significant scholarship as to whether
Parker explicitly created an antitrust exemption for states or whether it
just espoused the traditional principles of federalism allowing states to
legislatively decide issues of public welfare.3 ° However, there is no
28. Id. at 341.
29. Id. at 350-51 (concluding that Congress had not intended "to restrain a state or
its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature."). See generally PHILLIP
AREEDA & DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 213a, at 72 (1978) (compulsion is
"powerful evidence" of existence of state policy).
30. See generally William Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory
Process: A Reconstruction and Critique of the State Action Exemption After Midcal
Aluminum, 61 B.U. L. REV. 1099 (1981); Einer Richard Elhauge, The Scope ofAntitrust
Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 667 (1991) (explaining that the antitrust case law
distinguishing state from private action fits a simple process view: financially interested
actors cannot be trusted to decide which restrictions on competition advance the public
interest); Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J. L. &
ECON. 23 (1983) (discussing the uneasy coexistence between federal antitrust law and
state regulatory regimes); Thomas Jorde, Antitrust and the New State Action Doctrine:
A Return to Deferential Economic Federalism, 75 CAL. L. REV. 227, 236-37, 241
(1987) (discussing how the roots of the state action doctrine are found in the values of
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question that Parker did stand for a state's right "to determine for itself
how much competition is desirable, provided that it substitutes adequate
public control whenever it has weakened competition."'"
a. State Sovereignty Through the Eyes ofParker v. Brown
In Parker, the California legislature approved a marketing program
for agricultural commodities under the California Agricultural Prorate
Act, 32 which restricted the manner in which raisin producers could
market their crops. The purpose of the legislation was not only to
restrict competition among raisin growers, but also to control the prices
of raisins to packers who, after processing them, placed them in
interstate commerce.33 The Act authorized the creation of an advisory
commission to approve, after extensive review, a "proration marketing
program" that would carry out the objectives of the Act, which were to
protect agricultural wealth, prevent waste and disallow unreasonable
profits to raisin producers.34 The appellee, a producer and a packer of
raisins, alleged that the proration program violated the Commerce
Clause35 and the Sherman Act.36 The Supreme Court, in dealing with the
allegation regarding the Sherman Act, concluded that neither the
language nor history of the Act demonstrated a federal intent to infringe
upon state sovereignty and limit the ability of state agents to act with
legislative authority.37 It concluded that the language of the Sherman
economic federalism); But see contra Wiley, supra note 15. See also Inman &
Rubinfeld, supra note 16, at 1232 (stating that "[t]he task of a well-articulated theory of
regulatory federalism - and a reasoned state-action doctrine in particular-is to define
the separate domains for federal antitrust rules on the one hand and state business
regulations on the other."). Furthermore, the authors note that the Sherman Act is the
"appropriate supervisory vehicle" in the case of regulatory policies creating "monopoly
spillovers." See id. at 1249.
31. AREEDA & TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 29.
32. CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 59881.
33. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 345-46 (1943).
34. Id. at 346-47 (referring to the state statute that declared the purpose as
"'conserv[ing] the agricultural wealth of the State' and 'prevent[ing] economic waste in
the marketing of agricultural crops' of the state").
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
36. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2004).
37. Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-51 (giving deference to the principles of federalism in
stating that "[i]n a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the
states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their
359
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Act referred to agreements or combinations and conspiracies exercised
by individuals and not the actions or programs of the state legislatures,
even those that restricted competition.3"
It is difficult to determine whether the Court in Parker created a
direct exemption to the Sherman Act when applied to the states, or
whether it just clarified that a federal act involving economic
competition would not infringe on a state's inherent authority to provide
for the public welfare of its people. 39 But it is enough for the purposes
of this article to say that Parker stood for state sovereignty. The Parker
immunity served as a compromise between a state's right to regulate
intrastate affairs for the welfare of its citizens and the need, as seen by
the federal government, to enforce antitrust legislation in order for the
U.S. economy to function as an economically efficient capitalist society.
After all, the antitrust laws help preserve the economic freedom to
compete for the U.S. business sector; they are the "Magna Carta of free
enterprise. 4 °
b. Status of State Action lmmunity after Parker v. Brown
The Supreme Court applied the Parker decision in various cases
that followed, each time adding new wrinkles.4 Almost forty years after
Parker v. Brown, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case,
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass 'n v. Midcal Aluminum,42 which
clarified some important parameters for state action immunity. The
question before the Court was whether a California wine-pricing system
authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents
is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.").
38. Id. at 352.
39. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
40. City of Lafayette, La. v. La. Power and Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398 n.16
(1978) (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) in stating
that the "[a]ntitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna
Carta of free enterprise" and that "[t]hey are as important to the preservation of
economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the
protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.").
41. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 350 (1977), Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), City of Lafayette
v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978), New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v.
Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
42. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
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violated the Sherman Act. Under this system established by a California
statute, wine producers and wholesalers had to file fair trade contracts or
price schedules with the state. The statute limited wholesale wine prices
to retailers and required wholesalers to set prices according to prices in
producer fair trade contracts. If there was no fair trade contract, the
wholesaler had to post its resale price schedules and file it with the
state. 3 Fines or license suspension or revocation threatened wholesalers
selling below the established prices." The Supreme Court held that this
wine-pricing system violated the Sherman Act.45 Even though the Court
found that there was a clearly articulated state policy to displace
competition with respect to wine-pricing, it also found that the price
setting and enforcement in Midcal was to be established by private
parties rather than by the state, thereby not providing sufficient "active
supervision" by the state.46 The Supreme Court's concern in Midcal was
that permitting the private wine producers to decide wholesale prices
would be the equivalent of condoning vertical price restraints.47 In no
way did the State monitor the market conditions or have a system in
place to periodically reexamine the program.48 Parker did not authorize
private parties to violate the Sherman Act, nor did it encourage them to
hide behind a "gauzy cloak of state involvement., 49 The Supreme Court
established what has later been referred to as the "Midcal test,"
providing two elements that must be met for antitrust immunity under
Parker. First, the challenged restraint must be "one clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed as state policy," and second, "the policy
43. Id. at 99 (citing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 24866 (West 1964)).
44. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 99-100.
45. Id. at 102-03. The Court referred to several prior cases in determining that the
California wine pricing system was in violation of the Sherman Act. See Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145
(1968); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Dr.
Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
46. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 103 (explaining that the fact that the wine producer held
the power to dictate wholesale prices amounted to vertical restraints). See also id. at
105 (describing the "active supervision" requirement for state action).
47. Id. at 103.
48. Id. at 105.
49. Id. at 106 (citing Parker in explaining that "[t]he national policy in favor of
competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement over
what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement").
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must be 'actively supervised' by the State itself."5
Some academic scholars have criticized the Supreme Court for the
outcome of cases following Parker because they not only deviated from
the federalist principles espoused in Parker, but also encouraged the
transfer of power from the state legislatures to administrative agencies.5
However, the Supreme Court in Parker noted that the proration program
was a valid state regulatory program which did not violate any federal
laws because it was "the state, acting through the Commission, which
adopt[ed] the program and which enforce[d] it with penal sanctions, in
the execution of a governmental policy. '52 Parker, in its call for state
sovereignty, also gave deference to the regulatory agencies while
recognizing that state legislatures have the inherent authority to regulate
intrastate matters through the regulatory agencies they create. Of
course, the Mideal case solidified this delegation of power by
establishing the "active supervision" prong requiring that conduct by
private entities be periodically reviewed by a regulatory agency in order
to obtain antitrust immunity.53
50. Id. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power and Light Co., 435 U.S. 389,
410 (1978)).
51. See supra note 30; see also Page, supra note 30 (asserting that the "active
supervision" prong of the Midcal test should be abandoned because it places too much
power in the agencies). But see William Page and John E. Lopatka, State Regulation in
the Shadow of Antitrust: FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 3 SuP. CT. ECON. REv. 189, 195,
210-213 (1993) (finding fault with prior scholarship that stated that clear articulation
was enough to determine state action immunity. The authors clarify that "this approach
appears to leave states free simply to repeal antitrust within their borders - a result
Congress could hardly have intended." They propose that the active supervision
requirement prevents a "naked repeal" by private parties of federal antitrust law.); John
E. Lopatka and William Page, State Action and the Meaning of the Agreement Under
the Sherman Act: An Approach to Hybrid Restraints, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 269, 277
(2003) (stating that "antitrust should defer to state restraints that are ancillary to some
positive regulatory program but not to naked repeals of federal statutory requirements."
The authors go on to say that "[a] simple suspension of antitrust structures without
adequate state supervision . . . reflects a naked repeal of antitrust."); Inman &
Rubinfeld, supra note 16, at 1257 (stating that "[a]s an approach for protecting political
participation of the citizens of the state in regulatory policymaking, Midcal's two-part
test has proven to be an important step forward."). See also Elhauge, supra note 30; but
see Wiley, supra note 15.
52. Parker, 317 U.S. at 352 (1943).
53. See supra notes 30, 51. But see Wiley, supra note 15; FTC, REPORT OF THE
STATE ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 13, at 12 (quoting Hallie in stating that "'the
2006] REHABILITATING THE FORESEEABILITY DOCTRINE
The problem with the Midcal test has been that it does not
necessarily advance the interests of the state as Parker had originally
intended for state action to do. Instead, delegation to regulatory
agencies allows for regulated entities such as public utilities with close
ties to the same entities regulating them to advance their own interests. 4
This appears to be what happened in Trigen and nothing in the Midcal
test protects against this. Furthermore, recent court interpretation of
Midcal increases the likelihood of "Trigen-like" results recurring,
especially in a deregulatory environment.
c. The "Elusive" Clarifications of the Midcal Test
In an effort to clarify the application of Midcal, the Supreme Court
in later decisions has in fact unveiled intricacies within Midcal that are
difficult for courts to assess. In Southern Motors Carriers Rate
Conference, Inc. v. United States,55 the Supreme Court applied state
action immunity to private entities. Motor common carriers organized
"rate bureaus" in order to submit to the Public Service Commission of
each state jointly fixed rate proposals.16 The United States alleged that
this activity violated federal antitrust laws and filed an action to enjoin
the rate bureaus. 7 The Supreme Court reiterated that Parker v. Brown
was decided on the premise that Congress in enacting the Sherman Act
"did not intend to compromise the States' ability to regulate their
domestic commerce. 58  Furthermore, it clarified that to interpret the
Parker immunity doctrine, as limited to actions of public officials,
would frustrate the state's ability to implement programs restraining
requirement of active state supervision serves essentially an evidentiary function: it is
one way of ensuring that the [private] actor is engaging in the challenged conduct
pursuant to state policy' rather than in pursuit of private interests.").
54. See generally Wiley, supra note 15; Elhauge, supra note 30; Easterbrook,
supra note 30; Rossi, supra note 17. But see Steven Semeraro, Demystifying Antitrust
State Action Doctrine, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203, 213-218 (2000) (using the
"status choice model" to characterize governmental institutions as generally seeking to
serve public rather than private interests. This model is premised on the assumption
that individuals act selfishly or altruistically based on their status or position rather than
on any inherent tendencies.)
55. 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
56. Id. at 50.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 56.
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competition among private parties. 59 The Court in Southern Motors
explained that 1) the Midcal test should not be narrowly construed as
applying only to public officials, and that 2) the test did not expressly
provide that the actions of a private party must be compelled by the
State in order to be immune from antitrust liability.60  This case
eliminated any perceived "compulsion" requirement in the Midcal test.61
The dissent in Southern Motors disagreed with the majority's
decision to eliminate any compulsion requirement in finding Parker
immunity for an anticompetitive act. It stated that such requirement was
consistent with prior Supreme Court cases and with Parker itself, which
argued that the anticompetitive conduct must be "'directed' by the State"
for it to be immune.62 It also pointed to other cases where the Court did
not grant immunity because there was no clearly articulated state policy
to displace competition with respect to the challenged conduct.63 On the
other hand, the majority opined that if state legislatures were required to
give more than "a clear intent to displace competition," the ability of
regulatory agencies to implement anticompetitive policies would be
frustrated. 64 It pointed out that prior decisions could not support the
degree of specificity that the petitioners insisted would have been
necessary.65
59. Id. at 56-57 (declining to "reduce Parker's holding to a formalism that would
stand for little more than the proposition that Porter Brown sued the wrong parties.").
60. Id. at 58-60 (explaining that "[t]he success of an antitrust action should depend
upon the nature of the activity challenged, rather than on the identity of the defendant."
Also, the Court emphasized that "federal antitrust laws do not forbid the States to adopt
policies that permit, but do not compel, anticompetitive conduct by regulated private
parties.").
61. Id. at 60. However, the Court also states that "compulsion often is the best
evidence that the state has a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed policy to
displace competition." Id. at 62.
62. Id. at 71 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing Parker and stating that the
Supreme Court "has repeatedly recognized that private entities may not claim the state-
action immunity unless their unlawful conduct is compelled by the state.").
63. Southern Motors, 471 U.S. at 71-74 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 64 (stating "[i]f more detail than a clear intent to displace competition
were required of the legislature, States would find it difficult to implement through
regulatory agencies their anticompetitive policies."). The Court looked to City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 415 (1978) in stating that
"[a] private party acting pursuant to an anticompetitive regulatory program need not
'point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization' for its challenged conduct." Id.
65. Southern Motors, 471 U.S. at 64. See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. La. Power and
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The disagreement between the majority opinion and the dissent
illuminates an unresolved jurisdictional issue in Midcal. Requiring that
the stated policy be compelled by the state shifts judicial deference to
the state legislatures and imposes on the courts the burden of
considering legislative intent. However, eliminating such a requirement
shifts the responsibility of determining whether or not an alleged
anticompetitive conduct comes under the aegis of state action immunity
solely onto the courts and away from the state legislatures. This is not
so difficult for courts when such conduct is an action of the state or of a
state supreme court. In these cases, courts have found state action
66 6immunity. However, for example in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,67
the Virginia State Bar, a state agency, required lawyers in Fairfax
County to adhere to a minimum-fee schedule published by the Fairfax
County Bar Association. 68 The Court denied immunity to the state bar
despite its status as a state entity.69 The Supreme Court focused on the
entity authorizing the anticompetitive policy and emphasized that
"private parties were entitled to Parker immunity only if the State
'acting as sovereign' intended to displace competition. ' '70 In Goldfarb,
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 394 (1978) (stating that "it is not necessary to point to an
express statutory mandate for each act which is alleged to violate the antitrust laws").
66. "When the conduct is that of the sovereign itself," the courts have no need to
defer to the supervision of the regulatory agencies. FTC, REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION
TASK FORCE, supra note 13, at 6-7 (contrasting cases dealing with actions directly
flowing from the state acting as sovereign and those resulting from non-sovereign
entities to which state legislatures have delegated power). See also Parker, 317 U.S. at
350-52 (explaining that the program was established by the California legislature in
order to displace competition in this market); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350
(1977) (finding state action immunity for Arizona Bar disciplinary rules restricting
advertising by lawyers because they were subject to re-examination and enforcement by
the Arizona Supreme Court); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984) (recognizing that
the Arizona Constitution gave the Arizona Supreme Court the authority to deal with
matters related to bar admissions and therefore there was state action immunity).
67. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
68. Id. at 776.
69. Id. at 791 (stating that "[t]he fact that the State Bar is a state agency for some
limited purposes does not create an antitrust shield that allows it to foster
anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its members").
70. Id. See also Southern Motors, 471 U.S. at 60 (discussing Goldfarb v. Va. State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975)). But see Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (citing
Goldfarb at 791, and distinguishing it from the alleged restraint that was immune
because it was "compelled by direction of the state acting as sovereign."); Hoover v.
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the state bar, in requiring County Bar minimum fees, was engaging in
private conduct that was not necessarily immune from antitrust
liability.7" While the Supreme Court has made it clear that "Parker
immunity is available only when the challenged activity is undertaken
pursuant to a clearly articulated policy of the State itself, such as a
policy approved by a state legislature, or a State Supreme Court, '' 72 it is
not as clear whether the Parker immunity applies to acts authorized by
state agencies as a result of legislative delegation of authority.73 Without
a requirement of legislative intent, the tendency of courts is to defer to
regulatory decisions regarding alleged anticompetitive conduct, though
the courts are consistent in holding that such entities lack any sovereign
status.74 It is from this two-tiered analysis that the disjointedness in the
courts' application of the Midcal test arises.
The majority in Southern Motors clearly recognized the role of state
agencies as the implementers of legislatively authorized anticompetitive
conduct and emphasized that as such, the agencies could not wait for
Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984) (holding that the Arizona Supreme Court had the final
authority in determining admissions to the state bar and therefore its related actions,
including delegating administrative authority to the Committee on Examinations and
Admissions, were immune from antitrust liability).
71. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 792.
72. Southern Motors, 471 U.S. at 63. See also supra note 69.
73. See William Page, Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v.
Brown in the Economic Theory of Legislation, 1987 DUKE L.J. 618, 621 (1987) (stating
that Parker's restricting immunity to acts clearly articulated by the state as sovereign is
necessary because "it ensures that state regulatory policies in conflict with antitrust will
be made in representative bodies after a full Madisonian reconciliation of conflicting
interests, rather than in administrative bureaucracies."); Wiley, supra note 15, at 715,
765-69 (attempting to reconcile "antitrust imperialism" with a set of criteria that focus
the courts' attention on identifying and containing the effects of capture).
74. See FTC, REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 13, at 6-7
(stating that "[t]he courts have been similarly consistent in holding that special purpose
instrumentalities lack independent sovereign status. A state Public Service
Commission, for example, is not sovereign and may not articulate state policy. The
same is true of state regulatory boards."). But see Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366, 386 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority
opinion that Otter Tail's actions were beyond state policy. The dissent explained that
there was a "clear congressional purpose to allow electric utilities to decide for
themselves whether to wheel or sell at wholesale as they see fit. This freedom is
qualified by a grant of authority to the Commission to order interconnection (but for
wheeling) in certain circumstances.").
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express authorization from the state legislature in order to effectuate
state policy. 75  As long as there existed a clearly articulated
"anticompetitive regulatory program" (an interesting choice of words
used in Southern Motors and later similarly expressed in Trigen) no
more detail regarding the implementation of the relevant state policy
was required from the state legislature.76 Furthermore, Southern Motors
recognized that "permissive" state regulatory policies would not
necessarily conflict with federal antitrust laws.77 However, the Court
never explained how "clear" legislatures must be in asserting a state
policy to displace competition in order to meet the Mideal requirement
of "clarity." Herein began the ambiguity of the applicability of the first
prong of the Midcal test and the first indications of the Court's
sanctioning a broader application of the state action immunity with
respect to regulated companies.
d. The Establishment of the "Hallian " Foreseeabilitv Standard
The same day as the Supreme Court eliminated any perceived
compulsion requirement from the Midcal test in Southern Motors, it
decided Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,7 8 which both reconciled
some of the concerns raised by the dissent in Southern Motors and also
provided some guidance to the courts in applying the Midcal test
without a compulsion requirement. It incorporated a foreseeability
standard into the state action immunity analysis when the actor involved
was a municipality.
The facts involved unincorporated Wisconsin townships, located
adjacent to the City of Eau Claire, which filed a lawsuit alleging that the
City had violated the Sherman Act in two ways: 1) by monopolizing the
provision of sewage treatment services in the area; and 2) by tying the
75. Southern Motors, 471 U.S. at 63 (stating that agencies "are created because
they are able to deal with problems unforeseeable to, or outside the competence of, the
legislature.").
76. Id. at 65 (stating that "if the State's intent to establish an anticompetitive
regulatory program is clear .... the State's failure to describe the implementation of its
policy in detail will not subject the program to the restraints of the federal antitrust
laws.").
77. Id. at 76 (stating that "state regulatory policies are permissive rather than
mandatory, there is no necessary conflict between the antitrust laws and the regulatory
systems; the regulated entity may comply with the edicts of each sovereign").
78. 471 U.S. at 34.
368 FORDHAMJOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. XI
FINANCIAL LA W
provision of sewage treatment services to sewage collection and
transportation services. 79 The City refused to supply sewage treatment
services to the petitioners. However, it did supply these services,
including sewage collection and transportation services, to individual
landowners in the area of the townships which were annexed by the City
through a referendum. 80  The Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's conclusion that such conduct was protected by state action
immunity because the relevant statutes expressed "a clear state policy"
to regulate the municipal provision of these services and to displace
competition in sewage services.8"
Relevant Wisconsin statutes granted authority to local city
governments for construction activities related to sewage systems.
8 2
They also provided ordinances for a city operating a public utility to
limit the provision of such service in unincorporated areas. In addition,
the municipal utility had no obligation to serve beyond the area
delineated by ordinance.83 The Wisconsin statutes provided that the
State's Department of Natural Resources could order that a city's
sewage system be connected to other areas. However, they also required
that if such a territory refused to become annexed to the city, these
orders to connect unincorporated territories to a city system would be
void.84  The Supreme Court concluded that the statutes clearly
contemplated that a city could engage in anticompetitive conduct in the
provisions of sewage services and that such conduct was "a foreseeable
result of empowering the City to refuse to serve unannexed areas. 85
79. Id. at 36-37.
80. Id. at 37.
81. Id. at 37-38.
82. Id. at 41.
83. Id. (citing WIs. STAT. § 66.069(2)(c) (1981-1982)).
84. Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 41 (stating that no such order of the Department of
Natural Resources was at issue in this case).
85. Id. at 42 (applying the analysis of City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978), in concluding that state action immunity is satisfied
because "it is sufficient that the statutes authorized the City to provide sewage services
and also to determine the areas to be served." The Court continued to state that "it is
clear that anticompetitive effects logically would result from this broad authority to
regulate."); cf Cmty. Commc'ns Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982) (holding that the
Home Rule Amendment to the Colorado Constitution allocated only "the most general
authority to municipalities to govern local affairs" and the Court states that such
amendment was neutral, allowing the municipality the freedom to decide every aspect
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With Hallie, at least with respect to municipalities, courts no longer
needed to directly point to the "clearly-articulated" policy displacing
competition as long as the conduct was the "foreseeable result" of state
express authority.86
In Hallie, the Court distinguished its earlier decision in Community
Communications Co. v. Boulder.87 The Court in Boulder concluded that
the Home Rule Amendment to the Colorado Constitution delegated to
municipalities a general authority to govern cable television regulation.8
Whereas the Supreme Court in Boulder concluded that such delegation
of authority was too general and neutral to satisfy the clear articulation
prong of the Midcal test, the Court in Hallie held that the State had
"specifically authorized Wisconsin cities to provide sewage services"
and had "delegated to the cities the express authority to take action that
foreseeably [would] result in anticompetitive effects., 89 Hallie carefully
distinguished Boulder and established that for the foreseeable conduct to
be protected under the aegis of state action, it must flow from clearly
expressed state policy that is specific. However, cases subsequent to
Hallie as applied by the courts have interpreted Hallie more broadly. 90
While some scholars who are critical of the Midcal test think of the
"Hallian" foreseeability standard as a refreshing change from the Midcal
test,91 there has been much confusion among courts on the manner in
of cable television regulation as well as policy relating to any other field of regulation
of local concern.).
86. Hallie, 471 U.S. at 42-44.
87. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
88. Id. at 55-56.
89. Hallie, 471 U.S. at 43.
90. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 381-82
(1991). See also Floyd, supra note 25 at 1076 (concluding that the way the Hallie
foreseeability test has been applied by the courts of appeals, "it has proven to have
essentially no bite, leading to the conclusion that the broader the delegation of authority
to act with respect to a particular subject matter, the more likely that anticompetitive
conduct will be held to be the foreseeable result of that delegation.").
91. See Page, supra note 30, at 1077 (expressing concern that the Midcal test
compromised the Parker principles because delegated too much control of regulatory
policy to the agencies). See also Wiley, supra note 15, at 715, 765-69 (1986) (stating
that the Mideal test is a "miserable procedural compromise," "fails to advance federal
economic policy," and that the clear-statement approach is ineffective and costly);
Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 16 at 1258 (stating that Hallie, in moving away from
assessing legislative intent, "undermine[d] the principal of political participation that
state immunity was supposed to serve."); cf Jorde, supra note 30, at 236-37, 241 (1987)
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which to apply this test.92 Perhaps the confusion has stemmed from the
Supreme Court itself. On the one hand, Hallie warned against requiring
explicit authorization by the State to displace competition. On the other
hand, the Supreme Court eliminated any compulsion requirements in
Southern Motors.93 In a prior case, City of Lafayette, Louisiana v.
Louisiana Power and Light Co.,9 4 the Supreme Court explained that in
deciding whether state action immunity applied to anticompetitive acts
by governmental bodies, a court did not necessarily need to find an
"express statutory mandate for each act." 95 It only needed to determine
whether the conduct was within legislative intent.96 City of Lafayette
went further than Hallie in that it expected the judiciary to look into
legislative intent, a rather high burden to place on the courts. Luckily, it
also recognized that this is not always an accurate determination because
of a possible, and likely, "tenuous" connection between legislative
authority and an agency's execution of that authority. Such
determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis. 9' The Hallian
foreseeability standard could be a useful tool in solidifying any tenuous
nexus between legislative intent and regulatory determinations as long
as courts tie the "foreseeability" of anticompetitive activity not with an
agency's delegated authority but instead tightly with the original
legislative express authority to displace competition in a market directly
related to the activity.98 To some extent, this would require courts to
(welcoming the Hallian foreseeability standard and criticizing the Midcal test as being
inconsistent with the principles of "economic federalism" because it limited the states'
ability to delegate economic decision making to agencies, municipalities, or private
individuals"). See also generally Floyd, supra note 25, at 1077-84 (citing Jorde).
92. See the discussion of how different circuits have applied the Hallian
foreseeability test, infra Part III.
93. See the discussion of Southern Motors, infra Part I.d.
94. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
95. Id. at 393-94.
96. Id. at 394.
97. Id. at 394 (stating that "the connection between a legislative grant of power and
the subordinate entity's asserted use of that power may be too tenuous to permit the
conclusion that the entity's intended scope of activity encompassed such conduct.
Whether a governmental body's actions are comprehended within the powers granted to
it by the legislature is, of course, a determination which can be made only under the
specific facts in each case").
98. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 387 (1973) (Stewart,
J., dissenting) (stating that if the congressional scheme was to leave decisions of
wholesale dealings up to the power companies "in the absence of a contrary
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first look at legislative intent and then to the foreseeability of such
activity flowing from such intent.
However, in a more recent case, City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor
Advertising,99 the Supreme Court, while taking some pressure off the
legislatures, also muddied the waters for the clear articulation analysis.
In deciding whether city zoning ordinances restricting billboard
construction and supporting the monopoly of the billboard business by
one private company were protected by state action immunity, 00 it
stated that the clear articulation prong of the Midcal test did not require
a "delegating statute" to "explicitly permit[] the displacement of
competition. It [was] enough.., if the suppression of competition [was]
the 'foreseeable result' of what the statute authorize[d]." ' 10 ' In Omni
Outdoor Advertising, the Court concluded first, that the purpose of the
zoning regulation was to displace competition in the specific market;
and second, that a municipal ordinance limiting the size, location, and
spacing of the billboard had the foreseeable result of preventing
newcomers from entering the market. 10 2 However, given the scope of
the legislative grant of zoning authority, such an ordinance was not only
foreseeable but substantially certain. The question that the Supreme
Court did not want to answer and reasoned was beyond the purpose of
state action immunity was whether, considering the timing of the
enactment of such ordinances, such regulatory measures were enacted
with the sole purpose of eliminating incoming competitors.10 3 A similar
requirement imposed by the Commission," then Otter Tail's refusal "was foreseeably
within the zone of freedom specifically created by the statutory scheme").
Interestingly, in using the foreseeability standard, the dissent revealed its deference to
the regulatory agency.
99. 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
100. Id. at 369.
101. Id. at 372 (citing Hallie, 471 U.S. at 41-42).
102. Omni Outdoor Adver., 499 U.S. at 373 (concluding that the purpose of the
zoning regulation was "to displace unfettered business freedom in a manner that
regularly ha[d] the effect of preventing normal acts of competition, particularly on the
part of new entrants").
103. See id. at 374-84 (rejecting the possibility of a conspiracy exception to the
Parker doctrine, stating that the principle of the antitrust laws is to regulate business
and not politics, and rejecting the "conspiracy exception" to the Noerr immunity which
would be applied "when government officials conspire with a private party to employ
government action as a means of stifling competition"). See generally Eastern R.R.
Presidents Conference v. Noerr, 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
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argument was made by the petitioners in Trigen.°4
II. SIDESTEPPING PARKER
a. The "Almighty" State Action ImmunitE Doctrine: Trigen-Oklahoma
City Energy Corp. v. Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co.
Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. ("OG&E"), a regulated electric
utility that served communities in Oklahoma and Arkansas, and Trigen-
Oklahoma Energy Corp., a wholly owned subsidiary of Trigen Energy
Corporation ("Trigen"), which operated industrial heating and cooling
systems around the country, competed indirectly for customers in
Oklahoma City. OG&E's retail electricity sales were regulated by the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission ("OCC") and the Arkansas Public
Service Commission. 10 5  Trigen began producing steam and chilled
water for the Oklahoma City market in 1989.106 It pumped the water to
Trigen's customers from a central station through an underground
pipeline owned by Trigen which required that buildings using this
system needed access to Trigen's underground pipeline.0 7  It is
important to point out that the state did not regulate Trigen's Oklahoma
City sales. 0 8 In its lawsuit against OG&E, Trigen alleged that OG&E
interfered with its business in trying to persuade Trigen's customers to
purchase cooling equipment, electric chillers, from a third party.1 °9
104. Brief for the Petitioner, Trigen, at 14-20 (No. 01-178). If this indeed was true,
Trigen serves also as an example of "capture" by strong parochial interest groups - a
phenomenon that a broad application of state action immunity seems to encourage. See
Rossi, supra note 17. But cf City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415-16 (stating that the
"Parker doctrine.., preserves to the States their freedom under our dual system of
federalism to use their municipalities to administer state regulatory policies free of the
inhibitions of the federal antitrust laws without at the same time permitting purely
parochial interests to disrupt the Nation's free-market goals").




109. See id. (explaining that buildings using "electric chillers consume[d] more
electricity for cooling than buildings served by Trigen," and that Trigen would not need
to serve buildings that had electric chillers for cooling, possibly explaining why OG&E
was concerned about competition by Trigen). It is also important to point out that
OG&E did not manufacture or sell chillers; it only sold electricity. Furthermore, the
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Trigen sued OG&E for twenty years of lost profits. First, Trigen
alleged that OG&E encouraged the County to install on-site electric
chillers and as a result, in renewing its contract with Trigen, the County
also convinced Trigen to reduce its capacity charge."0 Second, Trigen
alleged that in order to obtain the contract with City's Myriad
Convention Center, OG&E misrepresented to the City the rates for an
experimental "Real Time Pricing tariff' which the OCC had recently
approved. "' Third, Trigen accused OG&E of eliminating the
competition by persuading Corporate Tower, which had a ten-year
contract (including renewal periods) with Trigen which was about to
expire, to install an on-site cooling system, in anticipation of the
expiration of a first renewal period of a contract. Corporate Tower then
decided not to renew its contract with Trigen."
12
Though arguably a concrete antitrust violation may be difficult to
find in this case, the Tenth Circuit proceeded to conclude that state
action immunity shielded OG&E's conduct from federal antitrust
scrutiny because 1) the state regulated OG&E's electricity sales; 2) the
OCC expressly approved the RTP tariff program; and 3) state action
protected the decisions of the City and the County regarding a contract
with Trigen and, as a consequence, this immunity extended to the
actions of OG&E.' 13  The Court determined that because the RTP
program in which OG&E offered to enroll the City was just another
state-regulated electricity sale, all of OG&E's electricity sales and for
that matter, all related sales, were protected by state action immunity.' '
In these ways, the Court concluded that the clear articulation and active
supervision requirements of the Midcal test were met.
OCC set the retail electricity rates of OG&E. Id.
110. Id. at 1223-24.
111. Id. at 1224. The case points out that, at that time, OG&E and Trigen were
competing for the contract serving the City's Myriad Convention Center. Also, the
RTP tariff was structured to give the customer more flexibility in using electricity and it
gave OG&E complete discretion in selecting its customers.
112. Id. at 1224-1225. OG&E and Trigen also competed for the Corporate Tower
contract. On a different note, the Court found that the state antitrust and tort claims
were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the OCC; therefore, there was no need to reach
the Noerr-Pennington and filed rate doctrine defenses. In addition the petitioner was
sued for tortious interference with contract and prospective business advantage.
113. Id. at 1225.
114. Id. (arguing that "[t]his argument, standing alone, is enough to mandate
dismissal of the federal antitrust claims.").
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The Tenth Circuit's application of state action immunity in Trigen
was a broad one. The Court relied primarily on the Oklahoma
Constitution's delegation of authority to the state legislatures to regulate
utilities." 5 The State's delegation of such authority to the OCC was
enough to protect from antitrust liability all anticompetitive conduct in
the context of the sale of electricity. 16  In other words, the state
constitution was the source of blanket immunity.17 The Court stated:
"[b]ecause Oklahoma has clearly articulated a policy to displace
competition with the regulation of electric utilities and because
Oklahoma actively supervises any allegedly anticompetitive conduct, the
state action doctrine immunizes OG&E's regulated electricity sales from
the federal antitrust scrutiny.""' 8 In this way, the Court reasoned that the
clear articulation requirement of Midcal was met. With respect to
"active supervision," the Court looked at several factors. The OCC
generally supervised OG&E in its tasks of setting electricity rates and
promulgating rules and regulations affecting OG&E's services and
operations." 9 Furthermore, the OCC had the power to visit and examine
the public utilities and it had jurisdiction over claims. 20 In finding
active supervision, the Court focused on OCC's "power" to supervise
rather than on the question of whether the OCC actually supervised the
particular activities in question. 121
115. See id. at 1226. See also OKLA. CONST. art. IX, §§ 15, 18.
116. Trigen, 244 F.3d at 1226. This state policy was therefore sufficiently
"articulated" to satisfy the first prong of the Midcal test which requires that a
challenged restraint be "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy."
The Midcal test provides that anticompetitive conduct is immune from antitrust liability
if the challenged restraint is 1) "one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as
state policy;" and 2) "'actively supervised' by the State itself." Id. at 1226. See the
discussion of the Midcal test, infra Part I.b. & c.
117. Trigen, 244 F.3d at 1226 (citing the Oklahoma Constitution which provides
that the OCC "shall have the power and authority and be charged with the duty of
supervising, regulating and controlling all ... transmission companies doing business in
this State, [and] in all matters relating to the performance of their public duties and their
charges therefore ...." OKLA. CONST. art. IX, § 18.).
118. Trigen, 244 F.3d at 1225.
119. Id. at 1226.
120. Id.
121. See Jim Rossi, Political Bargaining and Judicial Intervention in Constitutional
and Antitrust Federalism, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 521, 565 (2005) (emphasizing that "[i]n
most cases, potential supervision of conduct alone has been sufficient to trigger state
action immunity from enforcement of the antitrust laws").
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Professor William Page has expressed concern that the Midcal test
transferred too much power to the regulatory agencies. He stated:
Theory and experience teach that, when the legislature has
transferred responsibility for central policy choices to a regulatory
agency under a broad delegation of power, the presumption of
popular consent to protective regulation is unwarranted. Although
agencies perform political functions, they do not necessarily make
the same economic choices as would the legislature if it were
presented with the same issues.
122
On the other hand, Professor Page also recognized that federalism
presumed that states would establish regulatory programs applicable
within their own borders. 123 The exact balance of power between state
legislatures and the agencies to which they delegate regulatory authority
is difficult to achieve. In its expansive deference to the OCC decision
regulating the rates of the RTF tariff program, Trigen confirmed some of
Professor Page's concerns regarding agency authority. 124  Ironically,
though, the Court did not focus as much attention on the fact that,
presumably, the OCC actively supervised the rates. Rather, the Court's
justification for immunity was broader. It granted immunity based on
the mere existence of a regulatory program established by the legislature
through the Oklahoma Constitution, ignoring the question of whether
the specific conduct in question was expressly authorized or "clearly
articulated" by the legislature.'25 The focus of the Court was not on the
challenged conduct itself but on the regulatory scheme that ultimately
had jurisdiction over questions related to the sale of electricity. Was the
122. Page, supra note 30, at 1113 (asserting that the "active supervision" prong of
the Midcal test should be abandoned because it places too much power in the agencies).
Cf Page, supra note 51 (clarifying Professor Page's more recent views on the active
supervision prong); Elhauge, supra note 30; Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 16.
123. Id. at 1099 ("Federalism considerations suggest that states should
presumptively enjoy the freedom to establish regulatory programs that are applicable
within their own borders without prior resort to Congress for approval by parties not
directly affected.").
124. Id. at 1099, 1113-15.
125. See generally Brief for Petitioner, Trigen., (No. 01-178) 2001 WL 34115993, at
* 12, * 16 (asserting that the Tenth Circuit held that because of OG&E's status as a state-
regulated electric utility, OG&E had clearly met the Midcal two-prong test for state
action immunity without further analysis into whether OG&E's specific conduct was
clearly authorized by the state).
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extent of the Court's broad deference to state agency authority such that
any transaction by OG&E related to the sale of electricity could be
construed as being regulated by the state? Yes, making any future
attempts for private companies to compete even in a market related to
electricity sales subject to monopolization by already established public
utilities, particularly those with designated exclusive service territories
or substantial regulation.
26
Even though the outcome in Trigen may possibly be purely an
anomaly, the case raises important issues for the relationship of state
action and broad judicial deference to delegated agency authority,
particularly in a deregulatory environment. Broad judicial deference to
agency authority, an authority that legislatures have delegated to
agencies within traditional regulatory structures, could render future pro-
competition policies virtually ineffective. In such an environment, new
entrants into the electricity market would run the risk of not being able
to compete in territories already exclusively serviced by public utilities,
even investor-owned utilities.127 Under the guise of state action, courts
may be unwittingly protecting anticompetitive conduct that significantly
affects the ability of new entrants to compete in markets explicitly
intertwined and perhaps dependent on the sale of electricity.
126. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377 (1973) (holding
that an electric utility's refusals to wheel power or grant access to wholesale power to
municipal systems was not immune from antitrust liability under state action. The
Court agreed with the district court's conclusion "that Otter Tail ha[d] 'strategic
dominance in the transmission of power in most of its service area' and that it used this
dominance to foreclose potential entrants into the retail area from obtaining electric
power from outside sources of supply."). See also Oklahoma's Electric Restructuring
Act, S.B. 500, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 1997), which has been delayed indefinitely
by S.B. 440, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2001). Under the Electric Restructuring Act,
retail access would have begun on July 1, 2002. See ENERGY INFORMATION
ADMINISTRATION, STATUS OF STATE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING ACTIVITY
(2003), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chgstr/restructure.pdf
127. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Verizon
Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004)
(concluding that Verizon's "alleged insufficient assistance in the provision of service to
rivals" was not a recognized antitrust claim). The Court explained that the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 sought to promote competition by requiring that local
exchange carriers share their network with competitors. "New entrants, so-called
competitive LEC's, resell these unbundled network elements ... recombined with each
other or with elements belonging to the LECs." Id. at 402.
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b. The Effects of General Delegation ofAuthoriV to Regulatory
Agencies
In contrasting the facts of Trigen with those of another Supreme
Court case, Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,128 the petitioners in Trigen
argued that the Tenth Circuit erred in its decision because, as in Cantor,
the state never intended to regulate a related market, cooling and heating
systems in the case of Trigen, but only the sale of electricity. In Cantor,
an electric utility, Detroit Edison Company, distributed light bulbs to its
electricity customers and incorporated the cost of the light bulbs into its
electricity rate.1 29 The state agency that regulated the distribution of
electricity at the time, the Michigan Public Service Commission,
approved the electricity price which included the cost of the light
bulbs. 3 ° When the plaintiff sued the electric utility for restricting
competition in the unregulated light bulb market, Detroit Edison argued
that its actions were pursuant to Commission approval. The Supreme
Court held that a private party would be immune from antitrust liability
if its conduct were pursuant to the direction of the sovereign state, since
the purpose of the federal antitrust laws was not to superimpose
additional regulation in areas already regulated by the state.13' Cantor
narrowed the scope of state action immunity and clarified that immunity
would be granted only for conduct within a market that was explicitly
regulated by the state as per state policy. At the time, there were no
Michigan statutes articulating state intent to displace competition in the
light bulb market.'32
Interestingly, contrasting Cantor and Trigen raises another very
important question of whether a state's delegation of authority to
regulate a specific market such as the electricity market may extend to
other related markets such as light bulbs as in Cantor or cooling and
128. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
129. Id. at 582-83.
130. Id. (noting that in the relevant market, Detroit Edison was the only electricity
supplier).
131. Id. at 594-98 (discussing the Court's resistance to finding an "implied antitrust
exemption" where there is state regulation. More specifically, the Court stated that
even under the assumption that Congress intended the antitrust laws not apply to all
state regulated industries, "that assumption would not foreclose the enforcement of the
antitrust laws in an essentially unregulated area such as the market for electric light
bulbs.").
132. Id. at 584.
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heating systems as in Trigen. The difference in the two cases is that in
Cantor, the Michigan Public Service Commission collapsed the two
markets under the aegis of the "sale of electricity" when it approved the
electricity price which included the cost of the light bulbs.'33 The
Supreme Court was clear in distinguishing the two markets and only
granting immunity to conduct within the market explicitly regulated by
the state, the electricity market and not the light bulb market. On the
other hand, in Trigen, a regulated utility, OG&E, executed activities
significantly affecting the competitiveness of a new entrant in a market
that could have dramatically affected OG&E's sale of electricity. Here
we see state action immunity being used to preserve the anticompetitive
nature of the sale of electricity at the expense of another, somewhat
related market such as cooling and heating systems. If we apply the
Hallian foreseeability standard, the legislative intent was to displace
competition in the sale of electricity and it was not foreseeable that, in
order to achieve this, the state would be condoning that OG&E, an
investor-owned utility, would also monopolize the Oklahoma City
market of cooling and heating systems in the area.
c. Hallie sheds some light on DelegatedAgency Authority
Arguably, when a court chooses to focus on state delegation of
authority to a regulatory agency rather than on the specific conduct in
question, all activities remotely connected to such delegation of
authority can be considered foreseeable and there is no need to use a
Hallian analysis. 3 4 Furthermore, improperly using the foreseeability
standard endangers the integrity of Parker because of the tendency of
courts to defer to the delegated authority of regulatory agencies.
Conduct that is the foreseeable result of agency decisions in principle is
different from conduct that is the foreseeable result of legislative
authority. Hallie and Southern Motors gave the legislatures more
flexibility in enacting regulatory policy but, at the same time, blurred the
133. Id. (stating that Respondent's arguments turn on the fact that the Michigan
Public Service Commission regulated the 'furnishing . . . [of] electricity for the
production of light, heat or power").
134. See discussion infra Part I.d. See also Hallie, 471 U.S. at 42 (discussing the
foreseeable result); Page, supra note 30. This is an example of the problem with
applying the state action too broadly: the broader the articulated policy, the greater the
probability of finding foreseeable anticompetitive conduct.
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clear articulation requirement by not clarifying the degree of specificity
required for the state policy and by not articulating the need for
establishing some "nexus" between such articulation and the specific
conduct in question.
In Trigen, the Tenth Circuit did not explicitly use a foreseeability
standard as used by other circuit courts to immunize OG&E's
anticompetitive conduct. 135  Rather, it simply argued that because
OG&E's conduct involved the sale of electricity, which was generally
regulated by the state through the Oklahoma Constitution, OG&E's
conduct was then protected. 3 6  The problem with the Trigen court's
analysis was that it did not focus on the conduct in question and in turn
never identified a nexus between such conduct and a clearly articulated
state policy. The Court simply concluded that "because OG&E [was]
acting in accordance with a clearly-articulated state regulatory program
and because it [was] actively supervised by the OCC, ... OG&E's
conduct [fell] within the heart of the state action doctrine and ... the
federal antitrust claims must be dismissed.' ' 137 The Court assumed that
as a consequence of the OCC's general authority to regulate utilities
such as OG&E in the sale of electricity that OG&E would naturally
come under this regime. As we have already seen, however, this
conclusion is inconsistent with Supreme Court decisions, in particular
Hallie, Boulder, and City of Lafayette. 138 OG&E was an investor-owned
135. See discussion infra Part I.d.
136. Trigen, 244 F.3d at 1226. See also Brief for Petitioner at 5, Trigen, (No. 01-
178). It is also interesting to note that the Tenth Circuit analyzed the second prong of
Mideal just as broadly as the first. It reasoned that because the Oklahoma constitution
prescribes that the OCC has "'general supervision' over OG&E" and its power to fix
rates for electricity and promulgate rules and regulations to this effect as well as 'full
visitorial and inquisitorial power to examine such public utilities," the active
supervision prong has been satisfied. See Trigen, 244 F.3d at 1226 (discussing the
Oklahoma Constitution, OKLA. CONST. art. IX, § 18 and OKLA. STAT. tit. 17, § 152(A),
(C) (2004)).
137. Id. at 1228.
138. In City of Lafayette, for example, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that "[a]
subordinate state governmental body is not ipso facto exempt from the operation of the
antitrust laws." City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 393. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
already established under Boulder that a general delegation of authority would not
satisfy the first prong of the Midcal test. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 51-56 (discussing that
the articulated state policy must be specific and not a general delegation of authority for
the Midcal test to be satisfied).
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electric utility regulated by the state but not a state governmental body
as was the OCC. Even if it were a state governmental body, City of
Lafayette confirmed that there would be no automatic exemption
because a court would still be required to determine whether the state
legislature "contemplated" the type of anticompetitive conduct being
challenged. "9
In essence, to expand the scope of the Midcal clear-articulation
requirement to include a "clearly-articulated state regulatory program"
essentially shifts all state power to regulate domestic markets from the
state legislatures to the regulatory agencies, and effectively renders all
regulatory policy "foreseeable." This interpretation assumes automatic
deference to administrative rulings as state policy rather than to statutory
rules. Courts would have no need to examine the specific conduct in
question; as long as it flows from a state regulated program, it would be
foreseeable conduct and therefore protected by state action immunity.
This would be inconsistent with the original intent of Parker.4 '
III. STATE LAW OR REGULATORY POLICY? WHICH CARRIES MORE
WEIGHT FOR COURTS WITH RESPECT TO STATE ACTION?
Courts are inconsistent in both their applications of state action
immunity and their assessments regarding the scope of the doctrine. In
particular, they differ in the interpretation of the clear-articulation
requirement of the Midcal test. Some courts tend to construe this
requirement more narrowly, while others construe it more broadly,
concluding that a mere state policy implementing a regulatory scheme
provides enough "clarity" to evidence an articulated state policy. Trigen
is an example of this type of assessment. A look at various decisions,
particularly from the circuits most active in state action litigation, will
help illuminate the ambiguities permeating the doctrine.
a. The Eleventh Circuit: Tipping the Balance of the Midcal Test.
The Eleventh Circuit has not been shy in granting immunity to the
anticompetitive conduct of utilities; however, the scope of the
139. Id. Arguably, "contemplation" is just another form of the foreseeability
standard.
140. See generally Page, supra notes 30 & 51. See Parker discussion, supra Part
I.a.
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application has not been as broad as in the Trigen case. In addition, the
cases in the Eleventh Circuit dealing with state action for the most part
have arisen in the context of exclusive service territories under a
traditionally regulated electricity market. Praxair, Inc. v. Florida Power
& Light Co.,141 for example, concluded that the state action immunity
doctrine protected regulated electric utilities' division of service
territories in the county in which the customer was located from
potential illegal restraints of trade. 42 Florida Power and Light ("FPL"),
an investor-owned public electric utility engaged in the generation,
transmission, distribution and sale of electricity, had refused to negotiate
a lower rate for Praxair, Inc.; therefore, Praxair requested service from
Florida Power Corp. ("FPC"), which had better rates. FPC refused to
provide the service to Praxair arguing that a 1965 territorial agreement
with FPL that divided the territory between FPC and FPL authorized it
to refuse service to a third party. 143 FPL historically served the area of
Brevard County where Praxair was located. '44 The utilities and Praxair
disagreed on whether the 1965 territorial agreement specifically
allocated this area to FPL. 145 It asked the Court to consider whether
"sufficient 'state action' by the . . . Commission" immunized the
division of the county into service territories by FPL and FPC from
possible antitrust liability.1
46
The Eleventh Circuit, in deciding whether state action immunity
protected the utilities, attempted to determine the circumstances
surrounding the Commission's approval of the territorial agreements that
resulted in Order No. 3799 in 1965 (the "1965 Order"). It considered
the parties' actions since the 1965 Order, which resulted in the
Commission's 1989 declaratory statement. 147 The Court stated that the
141. 64 F.3d 609 (1 lth Cir. 1995).
142. Id. at 611. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2004).
143. Praxair, 64 F.3d at 611. See also id. at 612-13 (describing the contents of the
territorial agreement).
144. Id. at 611.
145. Id. Praxair contended that the Florida Public Service Commission approved the
territorial agreement without a specific allocation of Brevard County to FPL or FPC.
Id.
146. Id. Petitioner appeals the district court's denial of its motion for summary
judgment in which the utilities should have been granted state action immunity. See
also 15 U.S.C. § 3 (stating that it is a federal antitrust violation to allocate territories).
147. Id. at 612 (stating that the parties' actions subsequent to the 1965 Order
"culminated in the Commission's 1989 declaratory statement interpreting that order.").
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solution turned on whether the Commission approved that the area in
question, Brevard County, be given to FPL. 148 If the conclusion was in
the affirmative, then the utilities would be accorded state action
immunity and summary judgment under these circumstances would be
appropriate. 149
It was unclear whether Brevard County (and therefore Praxair) was
in the FPC or FPL service areas. The Court looked at the purpose of the
agreement, which was "to avoid duplication of service in [certain] areas
of the state.' 1 50 The Commission had to approve any deviations from
the 1965 Order.1 51 In this way, the second prong of the Midcal test, the
"active supervision" requirement, was met. While not ignoring the
"active supervision" requirement, the Court's focus was on whether
there was clear and express articulation to displace competition through
the allocation of service territories. It considered whether the
Commission, in light of that articulation, reasonably interpreted the 1965
Order as allocating the territories as above-mentioned. In order to
determine the intent of the agreement, the Court also looked at old maps,
revisited Commission hearings and testimony of witnesses, and
considered the consistent conduct of the Commission of treating Brevard
County as being serviced by FPL. 152 The Court finally determined that
Brevard County was indeed serviced by FPL and that the Commission
had correctly denied FPL the permission to wheel power to Praxair
because it would be in contravention of the approved 1965 territorial
agreement. 53  Therefore, FPL's specific conduct, refusing to wheel
power to Praxair because of the 1965 territorial agreement, would be
148. Id. at 612-13 (describing the court's review of the relevant territorial
agreements and surrounding circumstances).
149. Id. at 612. In the 1965 Order, the Commission had approved several FPL and
FPC territorial agreements, including the current agreement. Id.
150. Id. (stating that "[tihe purpose of the agreement was to avoid duplication of
service in areas of the state where there was significant population growth and where
the utilities' service areas were converging.").
151. Id.
152. Id. at 612-14. See Page, supra note 30, at 1122-26 (discussing the dangers of
looking to the intent of the legislature). See also Floyd, supra note 25, at 1119-20
(expressing concern with retrospective agency clarification of state policy because such
review would "frustrate the core purpose of the clear articulation requirement" which is
to ensure that anticompetitive policy be authorized by the state decision-makers).
153. Praxair, 64 F.3d at 614 (concluding that "the Commission reasonably
interpreted the prior agreement to allocate Brevard County to Florida Power & Light.").
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protected by state action immunity.
Like Trigen, the Court in Praxair gave much deference to the
Commission and its approval of the territorial agreements as well as the
resulting 1965 Order which allocated the territories. However, it
differed from Trigen in that it focused on the specific conduct in
question, the wheeling of power to a territory not within the original
service territory, and on whether there was clear and express articulation
to displace competition as to wheeling power in these territories. It did
not, as in Trigen, determine that because the legislature had delegated to
the Florida Commission the power to approve such agreements, then as
a consequence, this conduct would be protected by state action
immunity. 154 Though the distinction is close, it is an important one
because the Court in Praxair, in finding state action immunity, did not
rely solely on the regulatory scheme as the Tenth Circuit did in Trigen.
It focused on the activity in question and then looked to the
Commission's decisions regarding this activity in deciding to shield
such activity from antitrust liability. The Court, however, did look to
the Commission's own interpretation of its own regulations as a
determining factor in finding state action immunity, therefore placing
much evidentiary weight on the actions taken by the regulatory agency
itself. '55 In this way, the Court collapsed the clear articulation and active
supervision prongs of the Midcal test. However, it also recognized the
legislative power to delegate its regulatory authority to a state agency
when it pointed to a 1986 Eleventh Circuit case stating that a "clearly
154. The Court points out, though, that the district court concluded that the first
prong of the Midcal test had been satisfied because Florida's case law and statutory and
regulatory provisions had "effectively displaced competition between electric utilities in
the retail market." Id. at 611 (quoting the Order at 9-11).
155. Id. at 613. ("An agency's interpretation of its own regulations must be given
controlling weight unless that interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation."). Also, FPL asked the Commission to issue a declaratory statement to
determine whether the utilities would violate the 1965 Order if they complied with
Praxair's request for Florida Power to sell Praxair electricity and for FPL to wheel the
FPC-generated electricity to Praxairs' plant. The Commission concluded the actions
would have been contrary to the Order. Id.
Hallie and Southern Motors gave the legislatures more flexibility in enacting regulatory
policy but, at the same time, blurred the clear articulation requirement by not clarifying
the degree of specificity required for the state policy and by not articulating the need for
establishing some "nexus" between such articulation and the specific conduct in
question. See supra Part II.c.
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articulated policy can be established if a state statute authorizes an
agency to regulate the area and 'provides' for a regulatory scheme that
inherently displaces unfettered business freedom."
'15 6
Despite its deference to the delegated authority of the Florida
Commission, the Eleventh Circuit in Praxair gives us some insight into
applying Midcal. First, the focus of the court must be on the specific
conduct in question. Second, a court must determine the conduct's
relevance to state policy to displace competition with respect to the
conduct in question. Finally, a court must look into the active
supervision of the regulatory agency over such conduct. However,
Praxair also illustrates that more likely than not, courts will collapse the
two prongs in determining state action.
Another Eleventh Circuit case, TEC Cogeneration Inc., RRD v.
Florida Power & Light Co.,"' also found that state action rendered a
public utility immune from antitrust liability for its allegedly anti-
competitive conduct.15  Specifically, FPL declined to wheel the
cogenerators' surplus power to other Dade County facilities arguing that
this would violate the Commission's self-service wheeling rules.15 9 As
in Praxair, the Court in TEC Cogeneration applied a less broad
interpretation of state action immunity than in Trigen. The Court took
into consideration the fact that the Florida legislature had given the
Commission "broad authority" in regulating FPL which in turn, had
monopoly power within its service area both as to the purchase of
wholesale power and the sale of retail power. 160  Also, the Court
recognized that the state had consistently regulated the relationship
between Florida utilities and cogenerators. 161 In TEC Cogeneration, the
156. Id. at 611 (citing Executive Town & Country Servs., Inc. v. City of Atlanta,
789 F.2d 1523, 1529 (11 th Cir. 1986)). But see Page, supra notes 30 & 51 (discussing
the dangers of delegating legislative power to state agencies).
157. 76 F.3d 1560 (11 th Cir. 1996).
158. Id. at 1563-64.
159. Id. at 1566.
160. Id. at 1568 (stating that the "Florida legislature gave the PSC broad authority to
regulate FPL.").
161. Id. (also stating that "the relationship between Florida utilities and cogenerators
has been subject to pervasive state regulation through statute and regulatory rules ....
A myriad of agency proceedings have transpired. The field has not been left to the
parties' unfettered business discretion. In addition, the Florida Supreme Court has been
active in its role of judicial review."). The Commission sought to balance the
competing interests of encouraging cost-effective cogeneration on the one hand and
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Court found that the Florida legislature had intended to displace
competition with regard to electrical utilities, satisfying the first prong of
the Midcal test. 162 As in Trigen, the Court also emphasized the fact that
the legislature had approved the establishment of a regulatory structure.
However, the focus of the Court in TEC Cogeneration was on the
second prong of the Mideal test. The ongoing relationship between the
regulatory structure and the FPL, the Commission's capacity to actively
supervise FPL, and the other evidence indicated sufficient active
supervision of the agency over the conduct of FPL. 163  Although the
Court did give deference to the state agency as a regulatory scheme with
the authority to displace competition in the electrical market, it did not,
as in Trigen, conclude that because of such regulatory structure, there
automatically was a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy authorizing FPL's conduct. Rather, the Court found solace in the
fact that the Commission had the power to regularly supervise FPL's
conduct through periodic reports and approvals.1
64
Arguably, the Court did not give an accurate analysis of the clear
articulation requirement of the Midcal test, as it never addressed whether
the policy itself was clearly articulated by the state. Rather, its focus
was once again on the obvious active supervision by the regulatory
agency, collapsing the two prongs of the Midcal test. Although this kind
of analysis is not uncommon in cases of broad state delegation of power
avoiding its subsidization by utility ratepayers on the other. Id. See generally, Rohit C.
Sharma, Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FERC, 23 ENERGY L. J. 157, n. 108 (2002)
(stating that FERC regulations were designed to encourage cogeneration).
162. TEC Cogeneration, 76 F.3d at 1568-69.
163. Id. at 1569-70. It is important to note that the Eleventh Circuit here
emphasized that the Commission's power to actively supervise FPL determined
whether there was sufficient active supervision notwithstanding whether the
Commission actually exercised this power. The Court clarified that this "power [was]
insulated." Id. at 1570.
164. Id. at 1569-70 (generally discussing the active supervision prong of the Midcal
test and finding that "the State of Florida, through its state regulatory agency ... ,
actively supervised FPL in the areas of wheeling, rates and interconnection"). For
example, in 1987, the Commission denied the petition by Metropolitan Dade County
Florida to allow TEC Cogeneration, Inc. to wheel power to Jackson Memorial Hospital
because they could not satisfy the Commission's self-service wheeling rules. Id. at
1569. See Page, supra notes 30 & 51 (discussing the dangers of delegating legislative
power to state agencies). See also Rossi, supra note 121, at 565 (stating that "many
appellate courts remain astonishingly deferential to regulators in applying the active-
supervision prong of the Midcal test.").
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to an agency, the Court in TEC Cogeneration failed to take into account
any level of specificity in determining whether the conduct itself was
consistent with clearly articulated state policy to displace competition. 
165
In this respect, Praxair was one step ahead of TEC Cogeneration - it
began the analysis with the specific conduct in question and not with
whether a regulatory scheme was in place and actively doing its job.
In deregulating statutes, the state legislatures delegate to agencies
the task of implementing competitive policy by establishing regulation
that encourages the development of workable wholesale markets.
However, with excessive deference to the agencies, if there is
questionable anticompetitive conduct, will those pro-competition rules
include processes for active supervision of the conduct in question?
Most likely not since the idea itself seems counterintuitive; however, it
would be for the agency to decide, empowering the agency even more.
In a deregulatory environment, broad application of the Midcal test
would lead to much confusion and arbitrary empowerment of state
agencies. Furthermore, new entrants to the deregulated electrical market
and even other related markets would run the risk of agencies
determining whether or not to allow their entrance into a newly created
market. This is contradictory to the promotion of competition and not
within the original intention of Parker. Furthermore, it would further
the effects of capture arguably already existing in the traditional
regulatory structures and in the dominant investor-owned suppliers
which they regulate. 166
The Eleventh Circuit once again upheld state action immunity in
Municipal Utilities Board ofAlbertville v. Alabama Power Co. 167 In this
case, various municipal utilities (the "Cities") brought an antitrust
violation suit against the defendants, a combination of electric
cooperatives and the Alabama Power Company, for allegedly entering
into illegal horizontal territorial agreements. 68 An Alabama statute,
165. TEC Cogeneration, 76 F.3d at 1568 (concluding that it was "clear that Florida
intended to displace competition in the utility industry with a regulatory structure").
Note that Florida has no deregulation legislation in place. ENERGY INFORMATION
ADMINISTRATION, STATUS OF STATE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING ACTIVITY,
supra note 26.
166. See infra note 262 (discussing various scholars' views on the delegation of too
much power to the regulatory agencies as furthering the effects of capture).
167. 934 F.2d 1493 (11 th Cir. 1991).
168. Id. at 1497-98. In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had
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which limited competition for customers among utilities by granting
exclusive service areas, included a series of private agreements dividing
service territories.1 69 The Court decided that this statute demonstrated a
"clearly articulated [state] policy to displace competition in the retail
electric market except for large industrial customers" in order to prevent
duplicating electric facilities.' 70 However, it had to revisit the case in
1994 to decide whether the active supervision requirement of the Midcal
test had been met.'71 It decided that the private agreements at issue were
actually approved by the Alabama Legislature and were incorporated
into the statute at issue, therefore providing the required explicit
approval of any territorial exchanges to which the private utilities
agreed.'72
Interestingly, though, unlike TEC Cogeneration and more like
Praxair, Municipal Utilities Board of Albertville focused its analysis of
the Midcal clear-articulation requirement on the fact that a regulatory
structure displacing competition was in place. The Court found that the
Alabama legislature had clearly articulated a policy to displace
competition in the retail electric market, except in the case of large
industrial customers, by providing for a regulatory scheme that clearly
displaced competition.173 It stated that "the Supreme Court ha[d] never
stated that the regulations adopted to displace competition must be
conspired with state officials in codifying these agreements into statutes so that they
would be immune from antitrust liability. See id.
169. Id. at 1502 (stating that the sections of statute dealing with private agreements
actually state that they are "consistent with the general purpose of the Acts to avoid line
duplication."). See also generally id. at 1496-97 (describing the history of the relevant
Alabama statutes).
170. Id. at 1502.
171. Id. at 1504-05 (explaining that in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor
Advertising, Inc. the Supreme Court "reiterated the principle that states may not
immunize private anti-competitive conduct merely by authorizing it."). More
specifically, the Court emphasized that the terms of the private agreements were not in
the record of the case as to the Alabama statute and therefore it was unable "to
determine whether they comply with the active state supervision prong of the Mideal
test." Id. at 1504.
172. See Mun. Utils. Bd. of Albertville v. Ala. Power Co., 21 F.3d 384, 386-88 (1 1th
Cir. 1994) (explaining that "[u]nder the 1985 Act... the Alabama legislature must
explicitly approve any customer allocations the parties might wish to make" and
concluding that the private agreements therefore qualified as being actively supervised
and immune from antitrust liability).
173. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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perfectly consistent with the articulated policy reasons supporting those
regulations."'17 4 The inquiry was whether there was a clearly articulated
state policy to displace competition and "not whether the adopted
regulations [were] the best means to accomplish that policy."'7 5  The
Eleventh Circuit correctly stated that the Supreme Court had never
required that regulations implementing the displacement of competition
be perfectly consistent with articulated policy reasons for supporting
those regulations; however, this is at best a "loose" understanding of the
elimination of the compulsion requirement under Southern Motors. 1
76
The Eleventh Circuit in Municipal Utilities Board of Albertville
broadly interpreted the clear-articulation requirement and it was not
unlike Trigen in its reasoning that the establishment of a regulatory
scheme would be sufficient to satisfy this prong of the Midcal test.
Interestingly, unlike Trigen, the Court's active supervision analysis
focused on the legislature's approval of the private agreements and not
on any decisions by the regulatory agency.
b. The Ninth Circuit Reveals the Usefulness of the "Hidden Prong" of
Midcal
In contrast to the Eleventh and Tenth Circuits where the Courts
have more readily granted immunity to utilities conducting
anticompetitive conduct, the Ninth Circuit has been more hesitant in
finding state action immunity for similar conduct. However, the Ninth
Circuit seems to apply the "Hallian" foreseeability standard more often
than other circuits.177  Furthermore, its narrow construction of the
foreseeability standard exemplifies that this "hidden prong," if used
correctly, could serve as an effective tool for clarifying ambiguities
arising from the recent application of the clear-articulation component of
the Midcal test.
174. Mun. Utils., 934 F.2d at 1502.
175. Id.
176. Id. See also Southern Motors, 471 U.S. 48, 61-62 (1985) (stating that "a state
policy that expressly permits, but does not compel, anticompetitive conduct may be
'clearly articulated' within the meaning of Midcal.") (quoting Midcal, 445 U.S. at 106).
177. See, e.g, Medic Air Corp. v. Air Ambulance Auth., 843 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir.
1988); Nugget Hydroelectric, L.P. v. Pac. Gas and Elec. Co., 981 F. 2d 429, 434 (9th
Cir. 1992); Snake River Valley Elec. Ass'n v. Pacificorp, 238 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir.
2001); Columbia Steel Casting Co. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 111 F.3d 1427 (9th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1112 (1998).
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(i) "Wheeling" Too Much Power to the Agencies: Snake River Valley
Electric Association v. PacifiCorp
The Ninth Circuit case, Snake River Valley Electric Ass'n v.
PacifiCorp, 178 was brought by Snake River Valley Electric Association
(SRVEA), a non-profit cooperative organized to buy electric power at
wholesale rate for its members who primarily purchased power from
PacifiCorp and Utah Power and Light Company, a subsidiary of
PacifiCorp.1 7 9 SRVEA argued that PacifiCorp violated sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Antitrust Act when it refused to allow SRVEA to
"wheel" and supply power to PacifiCorp's customers through
PacifiCorp's electric transmission facilities.18 0 PacifiCorp, alleging state
action immunity, argued that the Electric Supplier Stabilization Act
("ESSA"), which allowed for regulation of the electric service providers
in Idaho, forbade a utility from supplying electric service to customers
connected to other electric suppliers without the consent of the other
supplier.'81 In this way, ESSA in essence "authorized" PacifiCorp's
refusal. The Ninth Circuit concluded that state action immunity did not
protect this conduct because there was no state supervision of such
refusal, despite ESSA's permissive policy allowing PacifiCorp to refuse
the wheeling and the supply of power by SRVEA.12  The effect of
178. 238 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Snake River 1], remanded and
amended, Snake River Valley Elec. Ass'n v. Pacificorp, 357 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2004)
[hereinafter Snake River II], cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 416 (2004).
179. Snake River I, 238 F.3d at 1191.
180. Id. The Court also noted that PacifiCorp owned the majority of electric
transmission facilities in the surrounding areas and controlled over 90% of the electrical
market in the Idaho Falls area. Id.
181. Id. (citing IDAHO CODE § 61-332B (1999)).
182. Snake River 1, 238 F.3d at 1193 (stating that "Pacificorp's refusal to grant
SRVEA consent to serve PacifiCorp customers is a foreseeable result of the ESSA.").
See also id. at 1194 (in discussing "active supervision" distinguishing itself from Liquor
Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987)). See also Duffy (stating in dicta that a state statute
might be written such that a state need not actually review individual price-setting
decisions). ESSA in Snake River I was not "self-policing" as was allowed in the
Supreme Court case Liquor Corp. v. Duffy. In Duffy, the Court acknowledged that
certain state acts that did not need active supervision because some statutes may be so
comprehensive or their applications so mechanical that actual state review would be
pointless. The Court in Duffy also suggested that a statute that specifies the price
margin between wholesale and retail prices may amount to active supervision, despite
the lack of actual state supervision over individual price-setting decisions. See also FTC
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granting state action immunity under these circumstances would have
been to allow private parties, such as PacifiCorp, the power to determine
when competition would be allowed. This would have violated the
Sherman Act and the "active supervision" prong of the Midcal test. 183
In essence, ESSA unwittingly delegated approval authority to supply
power not to the regulatory agency but to the regulated investor-owned
utility. Not unlike the Eleventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit's focus on the
active supervision prong of the Midcal test demonstrates again the
tendency of courts to defer to the administrative power of the regulatory
agency. However, it would not go as far as deferring to delegated
authority of the regulated private entity. 184
In response to this decision, the Idaho legislature amended ESSA to
comply with the "active supervision" component of the Midcal test.
These amendments allowed an electrical supplier to refuse to wheel
under particular circumstances and if there was such refusal, that
supplier was required "to petition the Public Utilities Commission for a
review of whether the conduct was consistent with ESSA."' 5 Also, if a
proposed supplier petitioned the Idaho Public Utility Commission and it
issued an order allowing service, then an electrical supplier such as
SRVEA could serve customers of another electrical supplier such as
PacifiCorp. I1 6 More recently, the Ninth Circuit revisited the case, in
Snake River II, and determined that these amendments did incorporate
v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 640 (1992) (citing Duffy dicta with approval).
183. In Snake River I, however, PacifiCorp had the power to grant written consent
for another utility to serve its customers. The Ninth Circuit did not agree that this was
sufficient active supervision and that in fact, it was the type of behavior that the Midcal
test was trying to prevent. Snake River 1, 238 F.3d at 1194 ("By providing an option for
competition and then an 'opt out' that is wholly within the utility's control and without
state supervision, the state has, in effect, given the utility partial control over the no
competition policy. This is the type of private power that the active supervision prong
of Midcal is supposed to prevent."). Cf Hallie, 471 U.S. 34, where, unlike Midcal, the
actor involved was a municipality and not a private entity. In fact, the purpose of the
second prong of the Midcal test has been to determine whether the State has exercised
sufficient "independent judgment and control" in determining the rates or prices
"established as a product of deliberate state intervention, not simply by agreement
among private parties." See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 634-35 (1992).
184. See Page, supra note 30.
185. Snake River II, 357 F.3d at 1048. See also IDAHO CODE §§ 61-332D(1), (2)
(Michie 2004).
186. Snake River 1l, 357 F.3d at 1048. See also IDAHO CODE § 61-334B.
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the requisite "active supervision" and therefore reversed its prior
decision and concluded that in fact PacifiCorp's refusal to wheel and
supply electricity was protected by state action immunity. Once again, a
court demonstrated its willingness to defer to the delegated authority of
a regulatory agency, a much more comfortable approach for the court
than relying on an approval to supply electricity from a private entity.
187
Turning to the issue of foreseeability, a closer look at Snake River
I's analysis of the first prong of the Midcal test reveals an interesting use
of the foreseeability standard. This "modem test for clear articulation"
incorporated the idea that in order "to meet the 'clearly articulated'
requirement it was not necessary for the State to expressly permit the
displacement of competition. Instead it was only required that
'suppression of competition [be] the foreseeable result of what the
statute authorizes'. 188 In determining satisfaction of the first prong of
Midcal, the Court in Snake River I found it necessary to decide whether
PacifiCorp's refusal to allow SRVEA to service PacifiCorp customers
was the foreseeable result of the state statute, ESSA. It concluded in the
affirmative. For this reason, the legislature amended the statute so that
such refusal authority remained with the regulatory agency and not the
private, regulated entity. Even though the timing of the amendment was
obviously in response to the initial sloppiness in the law, the legislature
did "clarify" the legislative purpose of the statute. Rather than
interpreting legislative intent, the Court in this case essentially
"required" the legislature to address the lack of clarity in the statute.
This seems more in line with the federalist principles of Parker.
In light of the courts' confidence in agencies to properly implement
regulatory policy, this "modern test" raises another question regarding
the clear-articulation requirement of Midcal: how clearly or specifically
187. However, the Ninth Circuit failed to address the issue that the amendments to
ESSA were passed subsequently to PacifiCorp's decision to refuse service. But since
this was a retroactive delegation of power by the state legislature and not the regulatory
agency itself, perhaps the Court did not see the need to address it. See Floyd, supra
note 25, at 1119-20. Interestingly, in Trigen, the Court did not distinguish between the
legislative delegation of power to a regulatory agency from that given to a regulated
private entity such as OG&E. In the eyes of the Tenth Circuit, all delegations of
authority came under the entire authorized regulatory scheme.
188. Snake River I, 238 F.3d at 1192 (referring to A-I Ambulance Serv. Inc. v.
County of Monterey, 90 F.3d 333 (9th Cir. 1996) quoting City of Columbia v. Omni
Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 372-73 (1991)).
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must a state policy be articulated in order for a court to conclude that the
conduct is in fact the foreseeable result of such policy?18 9 Interestingly,
Snake River I narrowly construed the foreseeability standard, tying it to
the specific conduct in question; that is, whether PacifiCorp's refusal
was the foreseeable result of ESSA. The "hidden prong" of the Midcal
test has begun to reveal its usefulness.
(ii) Another Window into State Authority: Columbia Steel Casting Co. v.
Portland General Electric Co. 190
In Columbia Steel Casting, the Ninth Circuit, in using a "Hallian"
foreseeability standard, somewhat narrowed the scope of state action
immunity. In its final analysis, the Court clarified its use of the
foreseeability standard, vacating its prior decision, 9 and distinguished
two other Ninth Circuit cases that also applied a foreseeability
standard. 1
92
Columbia Steel Casting Co., a consumer of electric power in
189. A similar question was asked in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S.
34 (1985). See infra Part I.d.ii.
190. 111 F.3d at 1427 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1112 (1998).
191. 1993 WL 312703 (D. Or. Aug 11, 1993) (No. Civ. 90-524-FR, Civ. 90-592-
FR), vacated by 111 F.3d 1427 (9th Cir. 1996).
192. Nugget Hydroelectric, L.P. v. Pac. Gas and Elec. Co., 981 F.2d 429, 434 (9th
Cir. 1992). Columbia Casting used Nugget Hydroelectric as precedent for its analysis
of the foreseeability test in the context of state action immunity. The Court granted
state action immunity to Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), a California public
utility company regulated by the California Public Utility Commission, in the business
of buying and distributing electricity, despite its refusal to grant a private power
supplier's force majeure claim for an extension of the contract period and its request for
conditioned deferral of the delivery deadline on unreasonable price concessions by the
private supplier. The California Public Utility Code and relevant regulations authorized
the Commission to specify the prices and the terms and conditions for the sale of power
by a private power producer such as Nugget to utilities. The Court concluded that
Nugget's decision to grant certain concessions was a "foreseeable result" of this state
policy and therefore the clear articulation requirement of Midcal was satisfied. The
Court also concluded that the alleged bad faith of PG&E was of no consequence in
deciding whether there was state action immunity. The active supervision prong was
satisfied as well. Id. at 434-35. See also Medic Air Corp. v. Air Ambulance Auth., 843
F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1988) (where the Ninth Circuit found that the monopoly of
dispatching services enjoyed state action immunity because it was both pursuant to a
state policy of granting such exclusive franchises and actively supervised. But it also
held that the use of the monopoly to injure a competing service was not immune.).
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Portland, Oregon, sued Portland General Electric (PG&E) and Pacific
Power and Light (PP&L), two electric utilities, for allegedly violating
the Sherman Act by dividing the city of Portland into exclusive service
territories. 193 PG&E defended on the basis that a 1972 Oregon Public
Utility Commission ("OPUC") approving the division of Portland
market into exclusive service territories rendered its actions immune
under the state action immunity doctrine. 194 After receiving the City
Council's approval of the exchange of the utility properties, PG&E and
PP&L entered into a 1972 Agreement which they submitted for OPUC
approval. The Agreement said nothing as to exclusive service territories
in Portland.' 95  They agreed to exchange facilities, including electric
distribution plants and all easements related to the operation of these
facilities. 196 By an Order issued in December 1972, the OPUC approved
the 1972 Agreement. The 1972 Order provided that the transfer of the
electric distribution plants would be pursuant to the 1972 Agreement
between the parties and that this exchange may include the transfer of
customers from one party to the other.
197
Columbia Steel Casting Co. operated a steel casting plant in the
area served exclusively by PG&E subsequent to the 1972 Order.'9"
When Columbia Casting Co. asked PG&E to wheel electricity generated
193. Columbia Casting, 111 F.3d at 1432.
194. Id. PG&E and PP&L competed for customers in the Portland area which
resulted in the duplication of transmission lines, poles, substations, and transformers in
the area. For many years they had unsuccessfully sought regulatory approval for
dividing the Portland market into exclusive service territories. The Portland City
Charter prohibited exclusive franchises and had a long-standing policy of encouraging
competition among the utilities. Id. at 1433. The City disapproved the division of the
service territories but approved only the "sale, transfer and exchange of plant and
property between [PG&E] and [PP&L]." Id. (citing Portland, OR., Ordinance 134416
(Apr. 26, 1972)).
195. Columbia Casting, Ill F.3d at 1433-34 (discussing the specific facts of the
case). The 1972 Agreement did refer back to a city ordinance which had approved the
exchange of facilities but had disapproved the establishment of exclusive service
territories.
196. Id. at 1434 (quoting language from the 1972 Agreement).
197. Id. at 1434-35 (discussing the specifics of the 1972 Order). After the issuance
of the 1972 Order, PG&E and PP&L stopped competing with one another in the
Portland area and they effectively served customers exclusively by only serving those
customers located "in the parcels in which they had acquired the electric distribution
facilities of the other." Id. at 1435.
198. Id. at 1435.
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by PP&L to its casting plant so that it could benefit from PP&L's lower
rates, PG&E refused, claiming its exclusive right to service Columbia
Steel Casting Co.'s plant pursuant to the 1972 Order.199 Columbia
Casting Co. filed the antitrust action against PG&E, PP&L, and
OPUC.200 The defendants contended that "the division of the Portland
market was cloaked with antitrust immunity by the 1972 Order of the
OPUC approving the 1972 Agreement., 20 1 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the decision of the district court denying state action immunity.20 2
OPUC and PG&E argued that their conduct of essentially dividing the
territory into exclusive service territories was a foreseeable result of the
1972 Order because the 1972 Agreement, in reallocating established
service territories into exclusive zones, had the effect of transferring
customers.2 3 In the original opinion,0 4 which was later withdrawn, the
Ninth Circuit agreed with PG&E and OPUC's arguments. 20 5  After
consideration of Columbia Steel's petition for rehearing and an amicus
curiae brief by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, the
Ninth Circuit withdrew its original decision. 0 6 It explained that it had
misapplied the foreseeability test because it essentially substituted the
"clear articulation" prong of the Midcal test with a foreseeability
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1435-36 (explaining the cause of action). Columbia Steel Casting Co.
later dismissed all its claims against PP&L. Id. at 1436.
201. Id. at 1436.
202. Id. It agreed with the district court that the 1972 Order decided by the City
Council "did not articulate a state policy to allocate exclusive service territories in
Portland." Rather, the Order approved a "one-time exchange of property" and of
customers which did not amount to the allocation of exclusive service territories. Id.
203. Columbia Casting, 111 F.3d at 1438 (quoting the Opening Brief of the Public
Utility Commission of Oregon at 9-10). Columbia Casting Co. counter-argued that a
one-time exchange of customers was the natural result of an exchange of facilities, "an
incident of the transfer of utility property," but not one that would result in the
permanent establishment of exclusive service territories. Id.
204. Columbia Steel Casting Co. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1390, 1399
(9th Cir. 1995).
205. The Court stated that although "the 1972 Order [was] not particularly clear
regarding the [O]PUC's intention to permit a permanent division of the Portland
market, as opposed to a one-time exchange of facilities and customer accounts.., the
elimination of competition between PG&E and PP&L was a natural and foreseeable
result of the 1972 Order." Id.
206. Columbia Steel Casting Co., Inc. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 103 F.3d 1446
(9th Cir. 1996).
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standard. 0 7
The Ninth Circuit's correction of its "faulty" analysis was an
important step for understanding the applicability of the foreseeability
standard with respect to the Midcal test. Like other courts, the Ninth
Circuit looked to the decisions of the Commission, OPUC, in
determining the validity of the 1972 Agreement and the meaning of its
provisions. The Court recognized that the Oregon statutes did authorize
OPUC to approve contracts among public utilities allocating service
territories and that this reflected a state policy to remove market
competition in the provision of electricity in Oregon.20 8 However, it was
also clear to the Court that the 1972 Order did not explicitly establish
permanent exclusive service territories and that it authorized only the
exchange of facilities, and not necessarily customers, within certain
areas. 20 9 The Court did not look necessarily to the behavior of PG&E
and PP&L, two private entities regulated by OPUC, as to each other. It
emphasized that "mere 'state authorization, approval, encouragement, or
participation in restrictive private conduct confers no antitrust
immunity.' 210  However, in applying the foreseeability standard, the
Ninth Circuit clarified that its deference would not extend to alleged
foreseeable outcomes flowing from those same regulatory decisions.
The issue being decided in Columbia Casting was whether PG&E's
refusal to wheel power to Columbia Casting was inconsistent with a
1972 Order issued by a state agency. The question the Ninth Circuit
originally asked was whether this conduct was a foreseeable result of the
1972 Order, a state agency decision, and not whether it was the
foreseeable result of a state policy (issued by the state legislature) to
207. Columbia Casting, 111 F.3d at 1444.
208. Id. at 1436 (quoting Pacificorp v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 770 F. Supp. 562,
570 (D. Or. 1991) in stating that the Oregon statutes "articulate the policy of the State
of Oregon to remove market competition as the basis for determining the customers of
the providers of electricity."). See also OR. REV. STAT. §§ 758.400 - 758.475 (2004).
209. Columbia Casting, Ill F.3d at 1437 (stating that "the state did not approve the
displacement of competition with territorial monopolies in the Portland market with the
clarity required by Midcar'). See also id. at 1438 n.8 (PG&E arguing that "the clear
articulation prong of the Midcal [was] satisfied because [the Oregon statutes]
'encourage exactly the kind of division that [PG&E] and [PP&L] carried out,' and that
whether or not the OPUC clearly authorized [PG&E's] challenged conduct is relevant
only to the active supervision prong of Midcal.").
210. Id. at 1440 (quoting Phonetele, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 664 F.2d 716, 736
(9th Cir. 1981) and Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1976)).
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displace competition in this particular way.2 1 The difference seems
semantic but it is an important one, for in the former scenario, authority
to regulate would have been shifted by the Courts from the state
legislature to the state agency, and in the latter, the authority would
remain within the state legislature and therefore be more consistent with
the original intent of Parker v. Brown.1 2
The foreseeability standard, if it is to be used as part of the Midcal
test, should be aligned with the clear-articulation requirement of Midcal.
In other words, it should be aligned with explicit state policy to displace
competition and not with state delegation of power to a regulatory
agency. 2 "  The kind of faulty analysis of the original Ninth Circuit
decision could result in granting to states antitrust immunities that they
did not intend to provide. Interestingly, despite important strides in
revealing the more accurate use of the hidden "foreseeability" prong,
(which is no longer so "hidden") the Ninth Circuit, like other courts, did
not discuss the extent of "clarity" actually required by the clear-
articulation requirement of Midcal. Although, it did point out that the
1972 Order had failed "to speak with sufficient clarity to satisfy the
Midcal test., 214 The Ninth Circuit also stated that state action immunity
"turns on the clarity of a state's expression of its policy, not the
subjective intent of its policymakers."2 5  The importance of "clarity"
becomes more obvious when applying the Midcal test in cases arising
from partially deregulated electrical markets, as we will see in the next
216section.
211. Id. at 1442-43 (explaining that it erred in its original conclusion that "private
conduct is immunized if it [is] a foreseeable result of state agency action and if
circumstances justify an inference that the agency intended to authorize the conduct,"
quoting Columbia Steel Casting Co. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1390, 1399
(9th Cir. 1995)). See also Nugget, infra note 158; Medic Air Corp. v. Air Ambulance
Auth., 843 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1988) (in which the Ninth Circuit also used the
foreseeability test).
212. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 359-63 (discussing federalist principles). See also
Page, supra note 30 and 51.
213. Columbia Casting, 111 F. 3d at 1444 (agreeing with and quoting the Antitrust
Division's Amicus Brief in stating that "express authorization [is] the necessary
predicate for the Supreme Court's foreseeability test").
214. Id. at 1437 (also stating that neither the 1972 Order nor the 1972 Agreement
addressed the issue of exclusive territories in the city of Portland).
215. Id. at 1442.
216. Interestingly, the Court in Columbia Casting alluded to the need for precision
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c. The Importance of Finding "Clarity" in State Policy
(i) Agency Declaratory Rulings Should Not Be the Solution
The Eighth Circuit case, North Star Steel Co. v. MidAmerican
Energy Holdings Co.,217 in granting immunity, raised important
questions concerning state action immunity in the context of the
restructuring of electrical markets. In this case, North Star Steel
Company, a steel mill operator, sued MidAmerican, the largest electric
utility in Iowa, for alleged antitrust violations when MidAmerican
refused to allow access over its transmission lines to alternate generators
of electricity and therefore prevented North Star from purchasing
competitively-piced electricity for its steel mill plant.2t 8 MidAmerican
at the time owned the only transmission lines supplying the North Star
plant.2'9  The district court, in granting MidAmerican summary
judgment, agreed with a declaratory ruling from the Iowa Utilities Board
that stated that the Iowa legislature had in fact passed legislation
designating exclusive service territories for the provision of electricity
220
and that such provision of electricity did not distinguish between
generation, distribution, and transmission of electricity. 22' Furthermore,
the district court deferred to the Board's conclusions that there was no
"substantive difference" between customers directly buying the
in applying the foreseeability standard particularly in the context of deregulation when
it stated that the fact that "[PG&E's] advantage [the transfer of customers to its
territory] proved to be transitory is not surprising given the competitive pressures that
technology and deregulation have been exerting on utility markets where monopolies
have traditionally reigned." Id. at 1439.
217. 184 F.3d 732 (1999).
218. Id. at 734.
219. Id.
220. Id. (explaining the relevant IOWA CODE § 476.25 (1997) which authorized the
Iowa Utilities Board to establish exclusive territories so as to encourage "coordinated
statewide service at retail" and discourage "duplication of electric utility facilities.").
221. Id. at 735. The Iowa Utilities Board was the state administrative agency
implementing regulatory policy. When MidAmerican requested a declaratory ruling
from the Board regarding its rights concerning the supply of retail electric services, the
Board concluded that MidAmerican had "a statutory duty to provide electric service to
customers in its exclusive service area." The Board also found that the relevant
statutes, which dealt with the supply of retail electric service, made no distinctions
between the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity. Id.
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electricity generated from third party suppliers or from MidAmerican
which would in turn distribute the electricity to end-users as well.222 In
this way, the Court collapsed the retail distribution of electricity which
clearly was regulated with the more open wholesale market for the
generation of electricity.
Not only did the district court defer to the rulings of the Iowa
Board, but also these rulings amounted to a statutory interpretation of
state legislation by a regulatory agency. 223 This was clearly beyond the
jurisdictional scope of a regulatory agency and at a minimum should
have not been considered a conclusive interpretation. The Eighth
Circuit did not choose to address the Board's rulings since the district
court had already made a determination.224 Instead, it proceeded to
determine whether or not there was state action immunity under the
premise that the exclusive service territory provisions of the Iowa
statutes included the generation of electricity for retail sales.225  The
Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court's finding of state action
immunity for MidAmerican's actions.226
The Eighth Circuit's decision not to address North Star's argument
that MidAmerican was protected from antitrust liabilities by the
regulations pertaining only to the distribution of electricity, but not to
the generation thereof, was a significant omission despite its justification
under the theory of collateral estoppel.227 North Star was arguing that
222. Id. (stating that "there was no substantive difference between a customer
directly buying the electricity generated by a third party or making MidAmerican buy
the electricity and then distributing it to the customer. Thus, the Board decided that
both means of retail wheeling would violate MidAmerican's rights under the exclusive
service territory state law and regulations.").
223. Id. Cf Praxair, Inc. v. Flower Power & Light Co., 64 F.3d 609, 613 (1995)
(stating that an "agency's interpretation of its own regulations must be given controlling
weight unless that interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.").
224. North Star, 184 F. 3d. at 735 (stating that the district court, in deferring to the
Board's declaratory ruling on the relevant Iowa statute, found that the state "ha[d]
clearly articulated a state policy to prevent electricity suppliers from competing for
retail customers.").
225. Id. at 736-38. The Court decided that because of the prior determination by a
state court that "the Board's assignment of exclusive service areas includes the
generation of electricity," it was "collaterally estop[ped] . . . from re-examining that
same issue." Id. at 737.
226. Id. at 739-40.
227. See supra note 223.
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the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity each had a
different level of competition.228 The utilities did not necessarily
generate all the electricity they distributed.229 In determining state action
immunity, the Court should have recognized that the state court should
have determined whether the generation of electricity came under the
state policy to displace competition before deciding whether
MidAmerican's particular anticompetitive conduct in this case was
pursuant to a "clearly-articulated state policy. 2 30  MidAmerican's
alleged anticompetitive conduct was intrinsically tied to this
determination of state policy.
The Hallian foreseeability standard may have been of some help in
this case. First, the Court would have had to identify the state policy, as
it did. But a more accurate understanding of state policy demanded a
determination of whether generation of electricity was part of the
exclusive service territory especially in light of the fact that 25% of
MidAmerican's supply of electricity came from third party generators.
Second, the Court would have had to decide if in light of such
legislation, it was foreseeable that an investor-owned electric utility such
as MidAmerican would have the authority to deny another private entity
access over its transmissions lines to alternate generators. After all, this
was the conduct in question. Thirdly, the Court would have had to
determine whether there was sufficient active supervision over such
refusal. Using this analysis, it is easy to see a difficult gap to overcome:
nothing in the legislation cited by the Eighth Circuit said anything as to
a private entity's ability to refuse transmission access. Furthermore,
there was not a tight enough nexus between MidAmerican's refusal and
the legislation granting MidAmerican an exclusive service territory.
However, with regard to private entities and exclusive service
territories, other courts, namely the Ninth and the Eleventh circuits, have
been more careful in ensuring that regulatory agencies actively supervise
228. North Star, 184 F.3d at 736.
229. The Court did not discuss this question, stating that this was an issue already
decided at the state district court level and under Iowa law, and that the circuit court
was collaterally estopped from re-examining the same issue. See supra note 223.
230. The state policy amounted to state legislation allowing for regulations that
would provide for exclusive service territories for utilities in order to "encourage the
development of coordinated statewide electric service at retail, to eliminate or avoid
unnecessary duplication of electric utility facilities, and to promote economical,
efficient, and adequate electric service to the public." North Star, 184 F.3d at 735.
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and that state policy directly authorize refusals by private entities to
wheel power.23' In North Star, though, the decision of whether to allow
for retail wheeling was up to a private entity, the investor-owned utility,
MidAmerican. MidAmerican could take advantage of lower generation
rates by purchasing from third party suppliers, but no other customer
coming under MidAmerican's "exclusive territory" could. Arguably,
this broad application of the clear-statement requirement favored
MidAmerican and eliminated competitors. Petitioners in Trigen also
expressed concern for this type of anticompetitive behavior.232
With respect to deregulation, the present facts of North Star state
that MidAmerican generated 75% of the electricity it sold in the
designated exclusive territory and purchased the rest from third party
generators. If it was the state's intention not to displace competition in
the generation of electricity, then any conduct pertaining to the 25%
electricity purchased from third parties would presumably not come
under the legislation establishing exclusive service territories. 233 But
according to the North Star opinion, the state policy made no distinction
between generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity, so any
conduct related to the 25% supply of electricity would "slip in" as
231. For example, Municipal Utilities found that the clear-statement prong was
satisfied based on the fact that the legislature had created a regulatory scheme, and then
concluded that the private agreements had been statutorily approved, thereby being
actively supervised not necessarily by the regulatory agency but by the legislature. See
general discussion of Eleventh and Ninth Circuit rulings infra Part III.a. & b.,
respectively. In Praxair, though the Court with respect to the clear articulation
requirement did not give quite as much deference to the fact that a regulatory scheme
had been established, it also found that private agreements had been part of the clearly
articulated state policy and were actively supervised by the Commission. In TEC Co-
Generation, the Court again emphasized that the local Commission actively supervised
permissive decisions by the utility. See discussion of Praxair infra Part III.a.
232. Petitioner's Brief at 12, 16, Trigen, (No. 01-178). See also Appellee's Brief,
Columbia Steel Casting Co., Inc., Columbia Casting, 1994 WL 16012180 at 17-24
(explaining that where state agencies are unwilling to authorize anticompetitive
conduct, the panel's standard may even encourage private parties to hide their
anticompetitive designs when seeking state acts, hoping to convince a court later that
the agency intended to do what it was unwilling to do. Thus the panel's standard not
only departed from the Supreme Court's standard, but also frustrated the policies on
which that standard rested.).
233. North Star, 184 F.3d at 736-37. North Star's argument turns on whether the
Board's regulation of retail rates and distribution of electricity implies that the Board
also regulates the generation of power. Id.
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protected under state action immunity. Most likely neither the district
court nor the Eighth Circuit considered it necessary to explore the issue
further, since all of the electric energy was sold under the brand name of
"MidAmerican" and it was only a small percentage that was bought
from third party suppliers.234 However, the failure of the Eighth Circuit
to clarify these distinctions and its reliance on the Board's statutory
interpretation sets a disturbing precedent for courts in the future. These
distinctions will have to be made in order to understand which conduct
falls under a regulatory regime structured to displace competition and
which falls under a newer regime that promotes competition.
(ii) Getting Back to Federalist Principles
One recent case, United States v. Rochester Gas and Electric
Corp.,235 took important strides for state action immunity in the context
of deregulation. It also exemplifies the manner in which the Hallian
foreseeability standard could be a useful tool for determining whether
the conduct in question comes under state policy as long as the state
policy relevant to the specific conduct is clearly articulated.
The United States Department of Justice brought an action against
the New York electric utility, Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.
("RG&E"), for an alleged per se violation under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.236 The United States alleged that a contract between the
utility and the University of Rochester, in which RG&E promised to
provide electricity to the university at a reduced rate in return for the
university's promise not to compete against RG&E in the sale of
electricity to consumers, was anticompetitive conduct in violation of
federal antitrust law.23 7 The University was planning to construct a
cogeneration plant in order to more efficiently meet its heating and
cooling needs and was going to sell the excess electricity to customers in
the area.238 The U.S. argued that RG&E entered into a "non-compete
agreement" with the University in order to prevent it from constructing a
234. Id. at 734.
235. 4 F. Supp. 2d 172 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
236. Id. at 173, 175.
237. See id. at 174 for more details on the parties' "Memorandum of
Understanding."
238. Id. at 173-74.
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producing facility that could compete with it in the sale of electricity.23 9
RG&E argued that state action immunity shielded its conduct; however,
the district court disagreed, denying defendant's motion for summary
judgment.24 °
Not unlike Trigen, this is another example of a private regulated
entity such as RG&E attempting to manipulate a related market, the
cogeneration facility market, in order to maximize the competitiveness
of its own electricity sales. Luckily, the Court saw through this and took
a specific look into the conduct in question rather than focusing on the
regulatory scheme in place. The Court also focused on the specific state
policy in question and even looked into the legislative intent of the
law.24 1 In fact, New York, at the time of this case, had already
implemented a flexible rate program which allowed regulated utilities to
compete with cogenerators by offering lower rates.242 The state policy
in question in this case was a New York Public Service Law allowing
the Public Service Commission to authorize utilities to offer incentive
rates to customers who were capable of obtaining electricity from other
courses. The Commission actively supervised these discounted rates
through approval mechanisms, though it is unclear from the evidence
presented that the Commission actually approved RG&E's service
contract or tariff filings. 243 However, after considering the language of
239. See id. at 175 (noting the United States' argument that "RG&E went too far in
negotiating the discounted rate by imposing a condition in the agreement the provision
that the University not compete with RG&E, nor solicit or join with RG&E customers
to generate electricity.").
240. Id. at 176. With respect to the allegedper se antitrust violation, the court stated
that there was a fact issue concerning whether the university was a bona fide potential
competitor of the utility.
241. Id. at 175 (quoting 1983 N.Y. Laws 626 in stating that the "legislative history
of this Section indicates that the New York legislature was concerned with the loss of
business and industry in New -York state, and the 'severe economic hardship and
dislocation' that occurred as a result of that loss. The legislature 'determined that the
cost of utility services can be a significant factor in retaining and attracting healthy
businesses and employment opportunities . ').
242. See Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment at 8, Rochester Gas (No. 97-CV-6294T).
243. Rochester Gas, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 175. See also New York Public Service Law §
66 (12-b)(a) (providing that the Public Service Commission authorize "incentive" rates
that utilities may offer customers "in order to prevent loss of such customers .... ).
The Court goes on to explain the purpose of the state policy of offering lower utility
rates. By offering these incentives, the State is reducing utility costs to consumers and
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the relevant New York statute as well as its legislative history, the Court
concluded that neither it nor subsequent regulation authorized non-
compete agreements among utilities and cogenerators such as the one in
this case.244
In contrast to prior state action immunity cases, the Court did not
defer to the decisions of the Commission nor to its active supervision
over state policy. RG&E needed to demonstrate that the state clearly
articulated a policy to displace competition among utilities and
cogenerators.245  In embracing federalism over delegated agency
authority, the Court stated that "[t]he fact that the New York Public
Service Commission ha[d] approved the contract at issue [did] not mean
that the State ha[d] authorized, and shielded from federal law, allegedly
anticompetitive behavior., 246 In effect, the Court in Rochester Gas and
Electric Corp. deconstructed the two prongs of the Midcal test and found
that the RG&E's use of the foreseeability standard did not reveal that the
non-compete agreement was the "foreseeable result of the State's policy
of allowing discounted rates. 247  This decision brings us back to the
days prior to Southern Motors and Hallie where courts tended to look
into legislative intent even if it was not an explicit requirement of
retaining or attracting other businesses based on those price levels. Cogenerators are
generally exempt from the State rate regulations imposed on utility companies;
therefore, cogenerators may at times sell their excess electricity directly to consumers
for a lower price. In this way, consumers are allowed to choose between electricity
providers. See id. at 176. However, there is not sufficient evidence that the
Commission actively supervised RG&E's tariff filing and initial service agreement after
they were filed with the Commission. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 17,
Rochester Gas (No. 97-CV-6294T).
244. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d at 176 (stating that "[b]ased on the
language of the statute, and the legislative history, it is clear that New York Law does
not expressly authorize utility companies to offer discounted rates to consumers who
are also potential competitors for the purpose of inducing them not to compete against
the utility.").
245. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 7, Rochester Gas, No. 97-CV-6294T.
246. Rochester Gas, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 176. The Court also emphasized that the
Public Service Commission was "not charged with enforcing federal antitrust law, and
did not review the contract to determine whether or not it violates that law." Id.
247. Id. The Court instead found that the purpose of the state policy in place was to
"reduce utility costs and retain or attract businesses based on those lower utility costs"
and that competition from co-generators was a foreseeable result of that goal. Id.
Please note that the Court did not use the word "foreseeable" in this context; it instead
explained that such competition was "consistent" with the goal of state policy.
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Midcal.
The Court in Rochester Gas took a much narrower view of the
scope of state action immunity and an even narrower interpretation of
the clearly-articulated requirement of the Midcal test. Unlike Trigen,
where the Court found a "clearly articulated" policy in the mere fact that
the state chose to regulate the sale of electricity in the first place without
considering the specific conduct at issue, Rochester Gas made an
"objective assessment" of the relevant state statutes and regulation
related to displacement of competition among utilities and
cogenerators.248 The Court found that in fact there was a clear
articulated policy to "promote" competition between utilities and
cogenerators and that the authorization of non-compete agreements was
not contemplated as a part of this state policy.2 49 Interestingly, RG&E
argued that its conduct satisfied the clear-articulation requirement
because it was the "foreseeable result" of the State's policy of allowing
discounted electricity rates.50  This Court responded to the
"foreseeability" argument with a literal reading of the state statute
authorizing discounted rates and by focusing on legislative intent.
Furthermore, it found that nowhere in the statute did it authorize the
kind of conduct in question; that is, permitting a utility to offer discounts
251to a potential competitor in return for a promise to not compete.
In not addressing the foreseeability argument, the Court was not
necessarily rejecting the Hallian foreseeability standard. On the
contrary, it found no use for it in this context.252 However, the Court
248. See Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law at 14, Rochester Gas, No. 97-CV-6294T
(explaining that to determine whether "a state has 'clearly articulated' a policy of
displacing competition requires an objective assessment of the state's statutes and
regulations.").
249. Rochester Gas, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 176 (concluding that the "State's policy of
allowing discounted rates does not implicitly authorize anticompetitive actions on the
part of Utilities seeking to prevent potential competitors from entering the market.").
250. Id.
251. Id. See also supra note 239.
252. But see Yeager's Fuel, Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 22 F.3d 1260 (3d Cir.
1994). In this case, oil dealers and suppliers of heating equipment brought a lawsuit for
antitrust violations against Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. ("PP&L"), an electric
utility company servicing Allentown, Pennsylvania and competing with the plaintiffs
for customers in the residential heating market. Id. at 1263. The Court applied a
foreseeability standard to the authorized conduct and argued that it was "reasonably
foreseeable that rebates, loans and other load management programs . . . could have
2006] REHABILITATING THE FORESEEABILITY DOCTRINE 405
could have clarified that the problem in RG&E's argument was that it
did not focus on the conduct in question. One analysis in accordance
with Midcal could have been as follows: 1) the state policy was
permitting utilities to offer discounted rates to customers who could then
choose different suppliers, and the purpose of this policy was not to
eliminate potential competitors but to attract more competition and offer
consumers the choice of lower rates; 2) a non-compete provision in a
service contract between a utility and a cogenerator (a potential
competitor, though the Court did not go so far as to define RG&E as
such), that makes these state authorized discounted rates available on the
condition of non-competition by the potential competitor, is not a
foreseeable result of such state policy; and 3) it is not clear from the
evidence presented that the Commission actively supervised the conduct
in question. In this way, the foreseeability standard would be
intrinsically linked to statutory authorization of the conduct in question
and not to an implicit assumption in the statute.
253
IV. REVEALING INACCURACIES: MIDCAL WITH A "HALLIAN" TWIST
While the 1992 Supreme Court decision, FTC v. Ticor Title
Insurance Co.,254 clarified and restricted the kind of state behavior that
constitutes "actively supervised" behavior, 25' recent decisions among the
circuits reveal disparities in the definition of conduct that is "articulated
anticompetitive effects." Id. at 1268 (discussing the use of the foreseeability standard
as used in Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.).
253. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 14 n.16, Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp.,
No.97-CV-6294T (explaining that the defendant misstates the law in asserting that the
illegal conduct meets the clear articulation requirement if it can be shown that it was the
"'foreseeable result' of some state policy."). Id. It adds that the foreseeability test set
forth by the Supreme Court is "whether the anticompetitive effects are a foreseeable
result of the authorized conduct . . . . RG&E's reading would dispense with the
requirement of finding an express authorization for the conduct, which is the necessary
predicate for the Supreme Court's foreseeability test." Id.
254. 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
255. According to Ticor Title, "actively supervised" state policy is one in which the
state has exercised "sufficient independent judgment and control." Id. at 634-35. But
see HYLTON, supra note 11, at 374 (explaining that Ticor Title empowers regulatory
agencies because "[i]f state action immunity is granted liberally, as is implied by a weak
active supervision requirement, then every decision by the state to regulate prices or
quantities immediately displaces federal antitrust law.").
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and affirmatively expressed as state policy. '25 6  The Supreme Court
denied a writ of certiorari submitted by the Petitioners in Trigen in
which the petitioners expressed to the Court the importance of clarifying
the scope of the state action immunity doctrine especially in light of
imminent state reforms to deregulate the electrical markets. 7
Case law has shown that the foreseeability standard has in fact been
applied as the "hidden prong" or, at a very minimum, as a supplement to
the Midcal test. In fact, the effect of the final decision of Columbia
Casting is that the "Hallian" foreseeability standard should be
considered as part of a court's application of the Midcal test in
determining state action immunity.258 However, for it to have any real
impact, it must be linked to the specific conduct in question and to the
specific state policy authorizing the conduct and not to a regulatory
policy per se. Cases have shown, though, that the foreseeability
standard has had less importance on the status of state action immunity
where there has been obvious active supervision by the agencies because
of the tendency of the courts to defer to administrative rulings.259
At a very minimum, the Hallian foreseeability standard serves as a
magnifying glass into a court's accuracy in applying the Midcal test. It
can illuminate the lack of an established nexus between the specific
conduct in question and the state policy in place. It brings to light
whether a court is simply deferring to delegated authority of regulatory
agencies or is looking to actual state policy. If state policy is ambiguous
as to the specific conduct at hand, then courts should not automatically
grant immunity. Rather, they should defer to the legislatures for
256. See supra note 13, first defining the "clear articulation" prong of the Midcal
test.
257. Petitioner's Brief at 6-8, Trigen, 2001 WL 34115993 (emphasizing the danger
of a broad application of the state action immunity doctrine to the deregulatory process
in the electrical industry).
258. See the discussion of the Hallian foreseeability standard as used in Snake River
I, supra Part I1I.b.i., and in Columbia Casting, supra Part III.b.ii.
259. See supra Part II.b. See also Floyd, supra note 25, at 1076 (stating that "[a]s
the Hallie 'foreseeability' test has been applied by the courts of appeals, it has proven to
have essentially no bite, leading to the conclusion that the broader the delegation of
authority to act with respect to a particular subject matter, the more likely that
anticompetitive conduct will be held to be the foreseeable result of that delegation.").
Cf Commc'ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982) (concluding that general
delegation to municipality cannot satisfy the clear articulation requirement or Hallie's
foreseeability test).
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clarification, as was done in Snake River. If the state policy available to
the courts is one that delegates general authority to a regulatory scheme
in displacing competition, such as in Trigen, Boulder provides an answer
- that the general delegation of authority is not specific enough to
invoke state action immunity. In the spirit of Rochester Gas & Electric
Corp., 260 in applying the Hallian foreseeability standard to a case like
Trigen, a few necessary questions unanswered by the Tenth Circuit
come to light in dealing with the Midcal test: 1) was there a specific
state policy other than the delegated authority to a regulatory program,
that addressed the issue of OG&E's specific anticompetitive conduct? 2)
if so, then was it foreseeable from this clearly articulated policy that an
investor-owned utility such as OG&E would steer away Trigen's
established customers in the manner it did, virtually eliminating a
potential competitor? and 3) did the OCC actively supervise OG&E's
conduct? The answers turn on the determination of clear articulated
state policy not just as it relates to the regulation of electricity markets
but also as it relates to the authorization of conduct intended to eliminate
potential competitors even in markets ancillary to the electricity market.
Another use for the Hallian foreseeability standard could be in the
context of the establishment of a presumption against state action,
particularly in states which have deregulatory or pro-competition
policies already in place. The harder issue is in rebutting this
presumption in cases of ambiguous state policy. One approach could
turn on the presumption that state legislatures do not foresee specific
anticompetitive conduct as being actively supervised by a state public
utility commission unless the defendant presents evidence to the
contrary.261 More specifically, courts could create a general presumption
against active supervision, forcing litigants to rebut the presumption by
presenting evidence of continuous regulatory activity.262
Whereas these approaches are certainly valid, they do not resolve
the judicial deference to regulatory agencies, encouraging the possibility
260. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
261. Special thanks to Professor Harry First for his insights on the presumption
analysis.
262. Rossi, Political Bargaining and Judicial Intervention, supra note 121, at 59
(stating that "rather than implying active supervision from the historical fact of
delegation, as most courts do, a general presumption against active supervision would
force litigants to present evidence of a pattern or regulatory activity and would elicit
more explicit future lobbying of regulators by monopolies").
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for capture of economic interests within already established regulatory
structures. Furthermore, they encourage courts to continue to collapse
the two prongs of the Midcal test under a primarily "active supervision"
burden of proof. This kind of analysis does not seem to be in line with
Parker and would be difficult to reconcile with deregulatory policy.
Rather, such a presumption should be aligned with the clear articulation
prong of the Midcal test as should the Hallian foreseeability standard. In
other words, courts could establish a presumption against state action
immunity (particularly in states with deregulatory policies in place)
when state policy as to the specific anticompetitive conduct in question
is ambiguous. Then the "Hallian" foreseeability standard could be used
to rebut this presumption in showing that the conduct does foreseeably
flow from the clearly articulated state policy. If the courts determine
that there is not sufficient "clarity" to make this determination, then the
presumption can not be rebutted until the legislature "clarifies" state
policy as to the specific conduct in question. In this way, the emphasis
of courts is on the "clearly articulated" state policy intended by the
legislature and not on regulatory rulings. That seems more in line with
Parker. This approach does not eliminate the possibility of also placing
the burden on the defendant to prove that the conduct has been actively
supervised, but only after a true determination of "clearly articulated
policy." This approach would require courts to not rely solely on
regulatory policies to justify anticompetitive conduct that perhaps was
never intended by the state legislature in the first place. The two prongs
of the Midcal test remain distinct and it is less likely that a broad general
grant of authority by the state legislature to the regulatory agency will
interfere with the free market mechanism. It is true that courts would
inevitably look into legislative intent to some degree; however, through
the use of the Hallian foreseeability standard and a rebuttable
presumption, clarification of state policy would be left up to the state
legislatures.263
263. See Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 16, at 1232 (explaining that "political
participation is likely to increase as policy responsibilities are decentralized to state and
local governments."). Furthermore, Inman and Rubinfeld emphasize that
decentralization of regulatory authority is also important so that the state and local
legislatures may retain the primary responsibility for regulatory policy and thereby
increase the possibility of citizen participation for reforms through the electoral process.
See id. at 1233. However, they also recognize that state legislatures have a propensity
to vote the majority rule, be indecisive, and vote for policies favoring the interests of
2006] REHABILITATING THE FORESEEABILITY DOCTRINE
In Snake River I, the courts could not find state action until they
determined whether the foreseeable result of the state statute was the
refusal by a private regulated entity to allow another supplier to wheel
power in its service territory. For this reason, the legislature had to
amend the statute in question and clarify this point (despite the fact that
the timing of the amendment may have seemed like a "quick fix" to
sloppy legislative drafting). Once the "clear-articulation" requirement
was met, then the court could consider the "active supervision"
requirement as it did in Snake River I. In this case, it was the role of the
state legislature to clarify state policy, not that of the courts and much
less that of the regulatory agencies. After all, this is the essence of
federalism in a democratic society - to make the legislators
accountable to the general public for policies they put in place, rather
than solely relying on the expertise of the regulatory agencies to which
they delegate authority.264 The "Hallian" foreseeability standard can
serve as the "nexus" between the alleged anticompetitive conduct and
specific state policy and help courts defer questions of state policy back
to the state legislatures.
CONCLUSION
State action immunity protects private and public entities engaging
in seemingly anticompetitive conduct from antitrust liability when it
falls under clearly-articulated state policy to displace competition in a
particular industry and is actively supervised by a regulatory agency.
The Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown established state action
immunity in order to reconcile issues of federalism and state sovereignty
with federal antitrust policies.2 65 Relying on principles of federalism and
their constituents, even if it is economically inefficient. See id. at 1234-35. See also
Jorde, supra note 91 (commenting that one of the goals of the state-action was political
participation).
264. See Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 16, at 1233 (stating that the antitrust state-
action doctrine may encourage political participation through decentralization of state
and local governments and the strengthening of legislative control over regulatory
policy-making. See also Rossi, supra note 17 (describing the possibility of interest
group capture of regulatory processes); Wiley, supra note 15 (describing generally the
effects of capture on regulatory agencies and demonstrating that the Midcal test is a
"bad procedural compromise" that does not address the effects of capture nor state
sovereignty).
265. See generally Parker, 317 U.S. 341.
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state sovereignty, the Court reasoned that Congress, in passing the
Sherman Act, did not intend to invalidate state authority to regulate
intrastate commerce.
Since Parker, several Supreme Court cases redefined the
applicability of state action immunity as it pertains to: 1) state
government; 2) extensions of state governance through administrative
agencies, municipalities and local authorities; and 3) private entities.266
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass 'n v. Midcal Aluminum established
a test to guide courts in finding state action immunity. However, lower
courts, in using the Mideal test to determine whether a particular
conduct adequately furthers state policy to displace competition in a
regulated area, have reshaped the scope of the Midcal clear articulation
requirement. Later Supreme Court cases attempted to clarify the
application of the Midcal test. Most importantly, Town of Hallie v. City
of Eau Claire established a foreseeability standard in which certain
anticompetitive conduct was protected from antitrust liability because it
was the "foreseeable result" of clearly articulated state policy. 267 On the
other hand, Southern Motors Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United
States eliminated any perceived requirement that the anticompetitive
conduct in question needed to be compelled by state legislatures in order
to be protected under state action immunity.26 s
Since these landmark Supreme Court cases, inconsistencies in
applying state action immunity have revealed a two-tiered level of
authority when determining state policy. On the one hand, courts look
to state legislation in deciding whether anticompetitive conduct is
authorized by state policy. On the other hand, they focus on the state
delegation of authority to regulatory agencies in determining the legality
of such conduct. In this struggle, the tendency has been to defer to
regulatory policy whenever possible. The misapplications of the Hallian
266. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Cantor v. Detroit Edison
Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); City of
Lafayette v. La. Power and Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558
(1984); Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985); Southern Motor Carriers Rate
Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985); Patrick v. Burget, 487 U.S. 1243
(1988); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991); FTC v.
Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
267. Hallie, 471 U.S. at 41. See also supra Part I.d.i.
268. Southern Motors, 471 U.S. at 58. See also supra Part I.c.
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foreseeability standard have explicitly illuminated this conflict.
Columbia Casting demonstrated that immunity granted to foreseeable
conduct flowing from regulatory policy compromises the integrity of the
clear articulation requirement. For anticompetitive conduct to be
shielded from antitrust liability, it must be the foreseeable result of
authorized state policy. In a closer analysis of the Midcal clear
articulation requirement, the foreseeability test is useless, unless 1) the
court determines specific state policy authorizing the specific
anticompetitive conduct in question; and 2) the court focuses on the
conduct in question and not on the regulatory scheme in place
supervising such conduct.
Many courts used the Midcal clear articulation requirement to
expand the scope of state action immunity. In Trigen-Oklahoma City
Energy Corp. v. Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co., the broadest
application of the Midcal test yet in the electricity context, the Tenth
Circuit concluded that the establishment of a regulatory scheme
administering the electrical market was sufficient "clear-articulation" to
satisfy the first prong of the Midcal test. Such an expansive
interpretation of Midcal could lead to difficulties for private investors in
the electrical market, particularly in light of future deregulation.
Currently, potential competitors run the risk of not being able to
compete because regulated investor-owned utilities, under the protection
of state action immunity, dominate not only the electrical market itself
but also the ancillary markets that can significantly affect their
electricity sales.269
The Hallian foreseeability standard is not an answer to the struggle
between regulatory policy and state legislation. However, it is an
important window to understanding the problem. It can be a helpful tool
in refocusing the courts' attention back onto state policy and away from
a misplaced deference to the regulatory agencies. Indeed, the challenge
is in determining whether the policy's objective is to displace
competition or to promote it. In this context, the regulatory scheme is
secondary to the state policy it implements. Excessive judicial
deference to traditional regulatory structures may burden states with
unintended immunities and empower regulated industries at the expense
of potential competitors, new entrants, and ultimately consumers.
269. See discussion of Trigen, supra Part I; Cantor, supra Part II.a.; Rochester,
supra Part III.c.ii.
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